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Abstract
THE RISE OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE IN THE SIXTIES: PAVING A NEW
ENTRANCE TO THE HOUSE OF MEDICINE. Anne K. Merritt (Sponsored by John H.
Warner). Section of the History of Medicine, Yale University, School of Medicine, New
Haven, CT.

This thesis investigates how emergency medicine evolved in the United States in the
1960s. Three case studies, Alexandria Hospital, Hartford Hospital, and Yale-New Haven
Hospital, demonstrate the changes in emergency medicine at a small community
hospital, a mid-sized teaching hospital, and an urban academic institution, respectively.
The government, the media, the American public, and the medical community brought
emergency medical care to the forefront of national attention in the sixties. In an era of
population migration to suburbs, the rise of group practices, and medical specialization,
patients’ relationships with their general practitioners dissolved. Emergency visits
increased astronomically because patients started to use the emergency room for nonurgent health problems. Simultaneously, physicians and house staff resisted working in
the emergency room. In response to rising patient loads, mounting criticism of
emergency services, and staffing problems, hospital administrators devised strategies to
improve the quality and efficiency of emergency care. The rise of emergency medicine in
the sixties was a result of (1) advances in pre-hospital, trauma, and coronary care which
distinguished a new clinical field and (2) the emergence of full-time emergency
physicians at community hospitals. Urban teaching hospitals, which established triage
systems and ambulatory care facilities in order to improve emergency services, resisted
the idea of emergency medicine and ultimately delayed its development as a specialty.

ix

Timeline of Events
YEAR

EVENT

1954

Dr. Robert H. Kennedy declares that the emergency room is the
“weakest link” in the chain of hospital care.

1958

The Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates
institutes an examination for foreign physicians.
Residents take the first step towards unionization by establishing
the Committee of Interns and Residents in New York City.

1960

The John A. Hartford Foundation makes a three-year grant to the
ACS to improve emergency medical care.
The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program provides health
insurance for federal employees.

1961

Dr. Mills develops the Alexandria Plan, a method of staffing the
emergency room with full-time physicians.
Dr. R. Adams Cowley starts the Clinical Shock Trauma Research
Unit at the University of Maryland.

1963

The American College of Surgeons (ACS) publishes national
standards for emergency departments.
The John A. Hartford Foundation grant is renewed for three years,
in order to further develop pre-hospital care.
Yale-New Haven Hospital institutes a triage system in the
emergency department.

1965

Medicare and Medicaid are passed.
The ACS favorably reviews the emergency services at Hartford
Hospital.

x

YEAR

EVENT

1966

The American Medical Association (AMA) publishes Emergency
Department: A Handbook for Medical Staff, which includes a
description of the Alexandria Plan.
Comprehensive Planning Legislation supports the development of
neighborhood health centers.
The National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
Committee on Trauma publishes Accidental Death and Disability:
The Neglected Disease of Modern Society.
The Federal Highway Safety Act provides funds for emergency
health services.

1967

Senator Edward Kennedy sponsors an amendment to provide
funds for comprehensive community health services.

1968

The American Society of Anesthesiologists recommends that a
physician should be assigned to the emergency department at all
times.
Attending physicians staff the Hartford Hospital emergency room
on a part-time basis.
Yale-New Haven Hospital trains ambulance personnel and runs a
citywide disaster drill. The Hill Health Center is established.
Harvard Medical School develops a post-graduate course for fulltime emergency physicians.

1979

The AMA Council on Medical Education and the American Board
of Medical Specialties (ABMS) approves emergency medicine as
the 23rd medical specialty, through recognition of the American
Board of Emergency Medicine (ABEM) as a conjoint board.

1989

The ABMS approves the ABEM as a full primary board.
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1
Introduction

This thesis investigates the evolution of emergency medicine in the United States.
Emergency medicine moved to the forefront of the health care system and evolved into a
new specialty in the 1960s. Before 1960, nurses and residents typically managed
emergency rooms and sought physicians’ assistance as they saw fit. The public relied on
general practitioners for most of their medical care and used emergency rooms only for
urgent surgical problems. Several forces brought emergency medical care to the
forefront of national attention in the sixties: the government, the media, the American
public, and physician leaders. These forces criticized hospital emergency services and
articulated strategies improve the quality of emergency medical care. Due to population
migration to suburbs, the rise of group practices, and increasing medical specialization,
the strong, long-established relationships between patients and general practitioners
dissolved. In this new environment, Americans started relying more heavily on hospital
emergency services. As patients streamed into emergency rooms, the diversity and
magnitude of illnesses there mushroomed. Simultaneously, house staff and physicians
started to resist working in the emergency room. Pressured by mounting criticism, rising
patient loads, and staffing problems, hospital administrators devised approaches to
improve emergency services. Many community hospitals hired full-time physicians to
staff their emergency rooms. These new physician leaders emerged at an opportune time
when advancements in pre-hospital, trauma, and coronary care were strengthening the
clinical foundations of emergency medicine. This combination of factors ultimately
facilitated the development of a new specialty.
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In my thesis I examine the following questions. Why did the function of the
emergency room change in the 1960s? How did social, political, and economic factors
facilitate this change? How did the government, the media, the American public, and the
medical community motivate this change? The first full-time emergency physicians
appeared in small community hospitals. Why did these physicians emerge in the sixties?
To what local needs were they responding? How did the broader changes in society
contribute to local changes in emergency room management? How did the first
emergency physicians influence the development of emergency medicine as a specialty?
Administrators at urban teaching hospitals devised different approaches to
improve emergency services. Rather than hiring full-time emergency physicians, they
continued to use house staff to run their emergency departments. They accommodated
rising patient loads by instituting triage systems and expanding outpatient facilities.
Why did full-time emergency physicians first practice in small community hospitals
rather than urban teaching hospitals? Why did academic hospitals resist the idea of fulltime emergency physicians? Why did emergency medicine gain recognition as a
specialty two decades after the appearance of full-time emergency physicians?
The first chapter examines the transformation of the emergency room into a
community medical center. Several factors facilitated this transformation. A climate of
economic prosperity and social activism provided an ideal opportunity for emergency
medical care to surface at the forefront of national attention. Several major forces in
American society – the government, the medical community, the media, and the
American public – demonstrated a growing interest in criticizing and improving access
to and the quality of emergency services. Simultaneously, patients’ relationships with
their private physicians dissolved for two reasons: people migrated from cities to
suburbs and private physicians became less available due to the rise of group practices
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and medical specialization. As a result of these changes, patients increasingly turned to
the emergency room for urgent and non-urgent medical care.
The second chapter examines military advancements that spurred the
development of pre-hospital, trauma, and coronary care in the US. These developments
established emergency medicine as a distinct clinical field and defined a new role of the
emergency room as a critical intermediary in the chain of urgent medical services. The
third chapter discusses the reorganization of hospital emergency services. Pressured by
rising criticism, ever-increasing patient loads, and staffing difficulties, hospital
administrators devised approaches to improve emergency services. Community
hospitals created a new occupational niche by hiring full-time emergency physicians,
while academic hospitals devised alternative approaches to the problem. The three case
studies further examine the reorganization of emergency services at the local level in
academic and community hospitals.
The fourth chapter examines the development of emergency medicine at
Alexandria Hospital, a small community hospital in Alexandria, Virginia. In 1961 this
hospital was the first in the country to experiment with a new staffing method: it hired
four full-time emergency medicine physicians to run the emergency room. Alexandria
Hospital’s approach to emergency care gained national popularity. Over the course of
the decade, full-time emergency physicians established a broad base of professional
support and ultimately organized at a national level in order to fight for specialty
recognition.
The fifth chapter examines how urban teaching hospitals resisted the
development of emergency medicine. Hartford and Yale-New Haven hospitals did not
hire full-time emergency physicians in the sixties. Instead, they viewed these leadership
changes with skepticism and attempted to reduce the patient load by establishing triage

4
systems and outpatient facilities. Emergency physicians’ struggle to gain acceptance in
teaching hospitals ultimately delayed the development of emergency medicine as a
specialty.
These three case studies demonstrate that the evolution of emergency medicine
began in small community hospitals that established the role of the emergency physician
long before an actual medical specialty existed. Urban teaching hospitals devised
alternative approaches to manage the patient overload and strongly resisted emergency
medicine. In later years the emergency department staffing method first used at small
community hospitals became a national standard for all teaching hospitals in the United
States. The evolution of emergency medicine eventually led its formal recognition as the
23rd medical specialty in 1979.
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2
Methods

This thesis uses a detailed analysis of three case studies to determine how
emergency medicine evolved in the 1960s. I chose to examine three hospitals in the
eastern United States: Alexandria Hospital in Alexandria, Virginia; Hartford Hospital in
Hartford, Connecticut; and Yale-New Haven Hospital in New Haven, Connecticut.
Their historical significance with regard to emergency medicine and their differences in
location, size, patient population, and academic affiliation make them informative case
studies. Many findings from these case studies apply to other regions of the United
States, but there are some limitations. First, East Coast cities lagged behind the rest of the
country in the development of pre-hospital care. In the late sixties and early seventies,
pre-hospital systems started to develop in the states of Illinois and Maryland and the
cities of Seattle, Miami, Los Angeles, Portland, and Columbus, Ohio.1 Secondly,
academic institutions in the eastern United States were slower to recognize the field of
emergency medicine than other academic institutions.2
In the 1960s Alexandria Hospital was a small, non-profit hospital that served a
middle-class suburban community and a small portion of indigent patients. It was the
first hospital in the country to hire a group of physicians to run its emergency room on a
1. Mickey S. Eisenberg, “The Resuscitation Greats: Leonard Cobb and Medic One,” Resuscitation
54, no. 1 (July 2002): 5.
2. Yale-New Haven Hospital, like several other academic institutions in the Northeast, delayed
establishing an emergency medicine residency program and providing full-time supervision of
house staff in the emergency department. Cincinnati General Hospital was the first hospital to
establish a residency program in emergency medicine in 1970, followed by The University of
Chicago in 1972.
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full-time basis. Hartford Hospital was a mid-sized, non-profit urban teaching hospital
that primarily served an indigent population. It was a national leader in academic
emergency medicine. In 1958 physicians at Hartford Hospital conducted an influential
study of the changing nature of emergency services at ninety hospitals in the Midwest
and along the East Coast.3 In 1963 the hospital held a national conference on emergency
medicine.4 Yale-New Haven Hospital was a large, urban academic center that primarily
served a poor patient population. It became affiliated with the Yale School of Medicine
in 1965. It was one of the few teaching hospitals that staffed its emergency department
with senior house staff rather than interns in the sixties.
For each hospital, I identified contemporary articles published in The New
England Journal of Medicine, The Journal of Trauma, The Journal of the American Hospital
Association, The Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons, and local medical journals, as
well as in popular publications such as Time. For Alexandria Hospital, I analyzed articles
published by the practitioners who participated in the Alexandria Plan. For Hartford
Hospital, I examined the minutes from emergency room committee meetings, annual
hospital reports, and the papers of Dr. Thomas Stewart Hamilton, the Chief
Administrative Officer of the hospital from 1954 to 1976. For Yale-New Haven Hospital,
I perused the files of Dr. Albert Snoke (the Executive Director of the hospital from 1946
to 1969) and Dr. E. Richard Weinerman (the Director of Ambulatory Services from 1962

3. Ernest C. Shortliffe, T. Stewart Hamilton, and Edward H. Noroian, “The Emergency Room and
the Changing Pattern of Medical Care,” The New England Journal of Medicine 258, no. 1 (January 2,
1958).
4. The conference included participants from Albany Medical Center, Maine Medical Center, The
University of Chicago, Massachusetts General Hospital, Henry Ford Hospital, Columbia
University, and several others. See Hospital Emergency Services: A Report on a Conference at Hartford
Hospital (Hartford, CT: 26-27 April 1963), in Box 17, folder labeled “Emergency Services,” Thomas
Stewart Hamilton Papers, The Hamilton Archives at Hartford Hospital, Hartford, CT, 4-6.
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to 1968) in addition to annual hospital reports from the 1960s. I also gathered oral
histories from emergency physicians, surgeons, internists, and nurses who had worked
in these hospitals in the 1960s.
I examined the development of emergency services at these three hospitals in the
1960s and included pertinent information about developments in earlier and later years.
These case studies highlight the effects of national trends in emergency care at the local
level. They illustrate how patients, hospital administrators, house staff, and physicians
revolutionized emergency services in their communities, and they provide insight into
the evolving function of the emergency room and the reorganization of emergency
services across the United States. I also conducted a quantitative analysis of population
growth compared to emergency visits for Hartford and Yale-New Haven hospitals.5 This
analysis indicates population growth was greater in suburbs than in cities, but
emergency room visits increased substantially faster than the population. These three
case studies demonstrate the different approaches that the small community hospital
and the urban teaching hospital used to improve emergency services. They reflect the
growing acceptance of, and resistance to, full-time emergency physicians across the
country. Based on this analysis, the specialty of emergency medicine originated in small
community hospitals and eventually gained acceptance at academic institutions.

5. While data existed for Alexandria’s population, the census of emergency room visits at
Alexandria Hospital in the 1960s was not available.
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3
The Emergency Room Becomes a Community Medical Center

The evolution of emergency medical care was primarily a response to public
demand. Richard Perloff, an expert in the science of persuasion, argues that three major
players contribute to political communication in America: leaders, the media, and the
public.6 Certain factors also encourage national interest in specific issues: the existence of
a favorable political climate, the expression of concerns by groups inside and outside the
government at the same time, public concern, and the articulation of policies to deal
with the problem.7 All of these factors were aligned for emergency medicine in the
sixties. The government, physician leaders, the media, and the public simultaneously
criticized and articulated strategies to improve the quality and efficiency of emergency
services.
As a result, the emergency room underwent a transformation. The emergency
room first existed as an “accident room” used to care for accident victims at the
beginning of the century. The 1960s witnessed rising public confidence in the emergency
room as the optimal health facility for medical care. The emergency room’s function
expanded from treating accident victims to treating patients with a range of non-urgent
medical conditions. This newly functioning emergency room became a reliable place

6. Richard M. Perloff, Political Communication: Politics, Press, and Public in America (Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 9.
7. Cook and Skogan, “Convergent and divergent voice models of the rise and fall of policy
issues,” in David L. Protess, ed., Agenda Setting: Readings on Media, Public Opinion, and
Policymaking (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991), 189-206, as cited in Perloff,
Political Communication, 231.
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where patients could come for any health problem at any time of day or night. Dr.
Albert Snoke (the Executive Director of Yale-New Haven Hospital from 1946 to 1969)
recognized that these changes led to a “metamorphosis” of the emergency room, from a
place that was considered the “last resort of the mortally ill” to a community health
center.8 This transition, marked by an extraordinary influx of patients, placed the
emergency room at the center of the health care system and provided it with a
newfound significance in society. Two major factors motivated this transformation: a
growing national interest in improving emergency services and the changing nature of
the patient-physician relationship.

A GROWING NATIONAL INTEREST IN IMPROVING EMERGENCY
SERVICES
In the 1960s an intensifying national interest in emergency services sparked a
paradigm shift in Americans’ perception of health care. The government, media, health
insurance companies, and physician leaders brought attention to the inadequacies of
emergency medical care and articulated strategies to improve the quality and
accessibility of emergency services. The two principles that stimulated these changes
were (1) medical care was a basic right and (2) the hospital was central to the health care
system. As emergency medical care moved to the forefront of national attention, the
public became interested in improving emergency services at the local level.

8. Richard E. Weinerman, “Changes in Medical Practice: Implications for Ambulatory Services of
Hospitals,” presentation before the New England Hospital Assembly, Boston, 29 March 1965, in
Box 2, folder labeled “Ambulatory Services,” Albert Snoke Papers, Yale-New Haven Hospital
Records, New Haven, CT, 5-6.
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An invigorated, idealistic spirit characterized the Kennedy-Johnson era. The
sixties were a decade of social activism marked by the civil rights movement, the
women’s movement, and the antiwar movement. The economy boomed: it expanded by
one-fourth between 1961 and 1965.9 The standard of living increased, the gross national
product (GNP) doubled, and employment rates dropped as low as 4 percent. The
Democrats’ landslide victory in 1964 and the prosperous economy created an unusual
opportunity for the government to increase federal spending and social legislation. After
Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, Lyndon Johnson took up the cause of economic
opportunity and declared an “unconditional war on poverty in America.”10 He launched
the Great Society Program, which included initiatives for public welfare, civil rights,
mass transit, public housing, federal aid to education, and urban renewal.11
The government also worked to improve the quality and accessibility of health
care. After World War II the government focused primarily on funding medical
research.12 Between 1940 and 1960, Congress increased the budget of the National
Institute of Health from $180,000 to $400 million.13 In the sixties the government’s focus
shifted from medical research to health care delivery. National health care expenditures
increased dramatically from $12.7 billion to $71.6 billion, or from 4.5 to 7.3 percent of the

9. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and
the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 366.
10. Ibid.
11. Kenneth Ludmerer, Time To Heal: American Medical Education from the Turn of the Century to the
Era of Managed Care (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 222-23.
12. Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century (New
York: Basic Books, 1989), 202.
13. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 342-47.
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GNP, between 1950 and 1970.14 This new interest in health care delivery occurred at a
time when the American public could better afford health care. Furthermore, after the
Depression and World War II, there was a shift in health concerns from chronic illness to
more urgent medical problems such as heart disease.15 This new sociopolitical climate
set the stage for the rise of emergency medicine.

The Hospital Emerges at the Center of the Health Care System
Growth in the number and size of hospitals across the country increased their
visibility and reinforced the perception that the hospital played a central role in medical
care. Government legislation also supported hospital expansion. According to
sociologist Paul Starr, the “emerging view among liberals in health policy was that
federal policy overemphasized hospital construction, while ambulatory care was
neglected.”16 The Hill-Burton Act of 1946 provided funding for hospital renovation and
expansion. The $3.7 billion dispersed under the program funded 30 percent of all
hospital projects up to 1971 and provided roughly 10 percent of their annual
construction costs.17 As hospitals expanded they became major employers. Staff in
America’s hospitals doubled to one million people between 1946 and 1960 and doubled
again by 1972.18
Medicare and Medicaid, which passed on 30 July 1965, increased public access to
hospital services. Medicare provided guaranteed hospital insurance under Social
14. Ibid., 335.
15. Ibid., 336.
16. Ibid., 364.
17. Ibid., 350.
18. Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth, 231.
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Security and established a program of government-subsidized voluntary insurance to
cover physicians’ bills. Medicaid expanded financial assistance to the states for medical
care of the poor. As a result, the rich and middle class saw physicians 20 percent more
often than the poor in 1964, but by 1975 the poor saw physicians 18 percent more often
than the rich and middle class.19 Medicaid primarily affected urban hospitals that cared
for large indigent populations. The new legislation covered hospital visits and
encouraged Americans to rely on the hospital emergency room rather than the private
physician’s office for medical problems.
Because rising patient loads and huge financial losses ultimately overburdened
hospitals, the government later shifted its focus from hospital-based to communitybased medical care. Under the Comprehensive Planning Legislation of 1966, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) supported the development of
fifty neighborhood health centers. In 1967 Senator Edward M. Kennedy sponsored an
amendment to provide funds for comprehensive community health services. Over the
next four years the Office of Economic Opportunity contributed to the development of
one hundred neighborhood health centers and other comprehensive service projects.
The purpose of the community health center was to provide a “one-stop” facility for all
ambulatory care. Half of the medical schools in the country participated in developing
these centers. As federal funds for these centers dwindled in the early seventies, these
medical schools ultimately lost interest in the program.20 Community health centers
provided a valuable resource for larger hospitals by diffusing the patient load in
emergency rooms. Because academic hospitals were able to manage their emergency

19. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 367-70, 373.
20. Ibid., 370-71.
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rooms without hiring full-time emergency physicians, the development of emergency
medicine as a specialty was delayed.21

Emergency Medical Care as a Basic Right
Federal tax authorities and state legislative and judicial systems reinforced the
idea that emergency medical care was a basic right. In 1969 federal tax authorities
required community general hospitals to establish a 24-hour emergency service,
accessible to everyone regardless of ability to pay, in order to maintain tax-exempt
status.22 This regulation encouraged hospitals to open emergency rooms. State
legislative and judicial systems enforced the hospital’s legal obligation to provide
emergency care to the entire community. For example, by 1961 Kentucky’s hospital
licensing law provided that “no person shall be denied emergency care solely because of
race, creed or color.”23 The state of Illinois established a fine for surgical hospitals if they
refused to provide emergency medical treatment.24 In Delaware, a child had died after
being brought to an emergency department at a private hospital. The courts ruled that if
a hospital was operating “a full emergency department as a community service…it must
accept any community residents coming to the hospital seeking the advertised
services.”25 These decisions reinforced the idea that hospitals should provide emergency

21. Refer to Chapter 7 for more information about the development of ambulatory care facilities
at Hartford and Yale-New Haven hospitals.
22. Wiliam J. Curran, “Legal History of Emergency Medicine from Medieval Common Law to the
AIDS Epidemic,” American Journal of Emergency Medicine 15, no. 7 (November 1997): 664.
23. John F. Horty, “When Hospital Has an Emergency Room It May Be Required To Give
Treatment,” Modern Hospital 96, no. 3 (March 1961): 104.
24. Ibid.
25. Curran, “Legal History of Emergency Medicine,” 664.
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care to all citizens. As a result of such legislative and judicial prompting, hospitals
started providing emergency services to all Americans.

The Rise of Private Health Insurance
Private health insurance became widespread in the late forties when it became a
fringe benefit of employment.26 By 1965 private medical insurance had become the major
method of payment for health care among the middle-class: it provided coverage to 75
percent of the population.27 The percentage of out-of-pocket health-care expenditures
decreased from 55 percent to 40 percent from 1960 to 1970.28 Many health insurance
plans excluded office visits but did cover emergency room visits.29 This validated the
belief that the hospital was the primary “authority on care” and encouraged patients to
use the emergency room rather than the physician’s office in order to minimize medical
costs.30 Health insurance companies provided financial incentives to use the emergency
room and effectively legitimized the superiority of the emergency room over the
physician’s office for medical care.

The Media Reveals Flaws in Emergency Services
The media emerged as a prominent national force in the sixties: it played a
central role in the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, the Kennedy-Nixon
26. Ludmerer, Time To Heal, 163; Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 373.
27. Ibid., 222.
28. U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Personal Health Care: Third Party Payments and Private
Consumer Expenditures,” Statistical Abstract of he United States, 1960-1970.
29. L.H. Nahum, “The ‘Emergency Room,’” Connecticut Medicine 29, no. 11 (November 1965): 763.
30. W. Herbert Springall, “The Hospital Emergency Room,” Arizona Medicine 21 (September
1964): 661.
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presidential debates, and several other political movements. As the emergency room
claimed the limelight, the media directed public attention to the poor state of affairs
within emergency medical care. According to one of the first full-time emergency
physicians in the country Dr. James Mills, “The public and the lay press were first to
notice emergency departments, to evaluate their shortcomings and progress. Journalists
found conflict, their essential ingredient, and made the most of it. Hundreds of column
inches appeared in lay magazines and Sunday supplements in the 1960s. Television and
radio presented interviews on this popular subject.”31 The media played an important
role in increasing public awareness of the flaws of emergency medical care and
encouraging public interest in improving emergency services.32
In a weekly magazine such as Time, Americans could read about the latest
advances in modern medicine.33 In 1963 the magazine published an article that
addressed specific shortcomings of emergency medical care.34 In 1968 it published an
article entitled “Emergency Care: Improvement Needed,” which argued that many
deaths occurred due to inadequate emergency care. It mentioned Former Speaker of the
House Joe Martin who fell into a coma and was taken to a distant hospital because his
doctor was not affiliated with a nearby hospital. He died in the ambulance. The article

31. James D. Mills, “Emergency Medicine: A Developing Specialty,” Journal of the American College
of Emergency Physicians, March-April 1973, 114.
32. The public has played a significant role in shaping the field of medicine. In the 1960s the
public increased their demands on physicians and expressed a growing discontent with the
medical system. In response to these tensions, the medical community sought to establish a new
doctor-patient relationship based on a response to patient concerns rather than paternalism. For
case histories that demonstrate how public attitudes affected medicine, refer to Barron H. Lerner,
When Illness Goes Public: Celebrity Patients and How We Look at Medicine (Baltimore, MD: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006).
33. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 336.
34. “Hospitals: Boom in Emergency Rooms,” Time, August 16, 1963.
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advocated the development of a well-organized system of emergency care in the United
States.35
In 1966 The National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
Committee on Trauma published a report entitled Accidental Death and Disability: The
Neglected Disease of Modern Society. Now commonly referred to as “The White Paper,” it
was a landmark publication in the development of emergency medicine. Its aim was to
increase public awareness of the problems with emergency services and trauma care in
the US and to encourage policymakers to address these problems. It identified trauma as
the fourth leading cause of death and the primary cause of disability in the country. It
criticized emergency departments for being “overcrowded,” “archaic,” and “poorly
equipped.”36 It also advocated adequate ambulance services, improved communication
between ambulances and the emergency department, the designation of a nationwide
telephone number to call an ambulance, and increased financial support for clinical
research in shock and trauma. It concluded that the general public was “insensitive to
the magnitude of the problem of accidental death and injury” in the United States.37
Such publications increased public awareness of the inadequacies of emergency
care in America’s hospitals and emphasized the importance of improving the quality of
emergency services. This media coverage occurred at a time when patients were
increasingly using the emergency room rather than the private physician’s office as their
preferred facility for urgent and non-urgent health problems. As the government and
media focused their attention on emergency services, the public simultaneously started
35. “Emergency Care: Improvement Needed,” Time, April 12, 1968.
36. Committee on Trauma et al., Accidental Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of Modern
Society (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1966), 6.
37. Ibid., 5.
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to use and criticize emergency services. They demanded that emergency rooms provide
efficient, high-quality care at all hours. In 1963 the President of Trinity College, Albert
Jacobs, was asked to attend a conference at Hartford Hospital in order to offer his
perspective on what the public expected of emergency services. He argued the
emergency department should be open twenty-four hours a day and should provide
“speedy” and “courteous” service.38
As the public began to participate more actively in emergency care, their
expectations of emergency services rose. According to Dr. Robert H. Kennedy, a trauma
surgeon who advocated improvements in emergency medical care and served as
chairman of the Committee on Trauma of the American College of Surgeons (ACS) from
1939 to 1951, “complaints began to come to the administrator’s office about emergency
care. Prominent people in the town were asking in letters to the newspaper why they
could not get prompter attention in the emergency department.”39 At smaller hospitals,
which were more vulnerable to local competition and the threat of lawsuits, such
complaints created even more pressure to improve emergency services.

Physicians Advocate Improvements in Emergency Services
The medical community became increasingly concerned about the state of
emergency medical care in the sixties. They developed guidelines and standards to
evaluate emergency departments and worked to promote further research in emergency
and trauma care. In 1954 Kennedy recognized that “the weakest link in the chain of

38. Hospital Emergency Services: A Report on a Conference at Hartford Hospital (Hartford, CT: 26-27
April 1963), in Box 17, folder labeled “Emergency Services,” Thomas Stewart Hamilton Papers,
The Hamilton Archives at Hartford Hospital, Hartford, CT, 35.
39. Ibid., 12.
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hospital care is the emergency room’s attention to the injured in most hospitals.”40 The
Committee on Trauma of the ACS played a critical role in evaluating and improving
emergency services: they surveyed hospital emergency rooms, developed national
standards for emergency care, and promoted the expansion of trauma research. In 1960
the John A Hartford Foundation made a three-year grant to the Field Program in
Trauma of the ACS.41 The committee used this grant to improve patient care in the
hospital emergency department. Members of the committee completed 330 on-site visits
of emergency departments. They found that only one-third of hospitals had an
emergency service committee, only one-third had procedure manuals, and only onethird permitted administration of general anesthesia. The study also demonstrated a
lack of consistency and adequate record keeping in emergency departments.42
According to Kennedy, “There are some hospitals which cannot tell how many patients
visit the emergency department in a year…personnel are assigned in varying numbers
for the different shifts, usually by guess. Few hospitals keep a record of the time of
admission and time of discharge from the emergency department, yet only thus can one
know whether patients are being attended to promptly and expeditiously, or whether
they are justified in writing a letter to the newspaper.”43 Based on the survey results, the
ACS concluded that most emergency facilities operated below generally accepted
standards.44
40. “How Good Is Your Emergency Room?” Modern Hospital 83, no. 6 (1954): 61.
41. “Trauma Program Receives Grant from Hartford Foundation,” Bulletin of the American College
of Surgeons, September-October 1965, 250.
42. P.A. Skudder, J.R. McCarroll, and P.A. Wade, “Hospital Emergency Facilities and Services, A
Survey,” Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons, 46 (March-April 1961): 44-50.
43. Hospital Emergency Services, 17.
44. Skudder, McCarroll, and Wade, “Hospital Emergency Facilities and Services,” 44-50.
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After the Hartford Foundation renewed its three-year grant in 1963, the ACS
worked to develop a set of national standards for emergency medical care. In
collaboration with the American Hospital Association (AHA), the ACS published a
document entitled Organization and Management of the Emergency Department in the
Hospital.45 In 1963 the ACS published a finalized version of these emergency department
standards after the Committee on Trauma, the Board of Regents of the ACS, and the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals had approved them.46 In addition to
developing standards for emergency care, the Committee on Trauma emphasized the
importance of trauma research through autopsy examination.47 By developing national
standards for emergency departments and promoting trauma research, the Committee
on Trauma played an instrumental role in the development of emergency medicine as a
specialty.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
At the same time as a national interest in emergency care was expanding,
patients’ close relationships with their private physicians dissolved. Four major factors
stimulated this change: population mobility, the rise of group practices, the trend
towards specialization, and increasing physician use of the emergency department. As a

45. “Trauma Program Receives Grant from Hartford Foundation,” 250.
46. It included the following stipulations: (1) a single director should run the emergency
department (ED) (2) ED policy should be determined by an ED committee representing all of the
major medical services (3) the ED should be open 24 hours a day (4) all patients should be seen by
a physician within 15 minutes after arrival (5) the ED should be located on the ground floor (6)
patients should not be permitted to revisit the ED unless the ED serves as an outpatient
department and (7) a manual of standard ED rules should be available for the staff. See
Committee on Trauma, “Standards for Emergency Department in Hospitals,” Bulletin of the
American College of Surgeons, May-June 1963, 112, 125.
47. Committee on Trauma et al., Accidental Death and Disability, 27.
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result of these changes, the emergency room started supplanting the private physician as
a reliable and accessible health care provider for urgent and non-urgent health
problems.

Population Mobility
Population migration from cities to suburbs separated patients from their
physicians.48 In the fifties and sixties, 20 percent of US citizens changed residences
annually; interstate moves increased from 5.8 to 9.4 percent from 1940 to 1960.49
According to a study of emergency department usage in Baltimore, Maryland, increased
use of the emergency room for non-urgent conditions correlated both with living at an
address for less than one year and with the lack of a relationship with a private
physician.50 As patients moved and were left without a private physician, they
increasingly turned to the emergency room for their medical care.

Rise of Group Practices
After World War II the nature of the general practitioner’s (GP’s) work changed.
GPs established group practices, provided care in the office rather than in patients’
homes, worked during regular office hours, and took more vacation time. Forty percent
of doctor-patient encounters took place in a patient’s home in 1930. By the fifties only 10

48. Geoffrey Gibson, “EMS: A Facet of Ambulatory Care,” Hospitals 47 (May 16, 1973): 61.
49. Michael J. White and Peter R. Mueser, Changes in the Demographic Determinants of U.S.
Population Mobility, 1940-1980 (Bethesda, MD: Urban Institute, November 1988), 5.
50. ML Webb, “The Emergency Medical Care System in a Metropolitan Area” (master’s thesis,
The School of Hygiene and Public Health of The Johns Hopkins University, 1969), 103-149.
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percent of visits took place in a patient’s home, and by the mid-sixties only 4 to 9 percent
of patient encounters were house calls.51
In 1950 the American Association of Medical Clinics held its first meeting.52 New
medical clinics provided a central location for patient care and allowed for a more
structured approach to the physician’s daily schedule. The medical profession was also
becoming more lucrative. Between 1945 and 1969, the consumer price index rose at an
annual rate of 2.8 percent; by comparison, physicians’ fees rose 3.8 percent and their
incomes rose at an annual rate of 5.9 percent. The average net income from medical
practice increased from just over $8,000 to $32,000.53 Because physicians in group
practices shared overhead costs and patient responsibilities, they were able to increase
their net income and vacation time. In this new era of profitable group practices, private
physicians were less accessible to their patients. Physicians were often unavailable
during nights, weekends, and holidays. In a 1958 study, 46.1 percent of hospitals
believed emergency visits increased because patients were not able to reach physicians
on weekends, nights, or holidays.54 A 1965 study indicated emergency visits increased at

51. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 359; Aubrey L. Night, Alan M. Adelman,
and Jeffery Sobal, “House Call Practices Among Young Family Physicians,” Journal of Family
Practice 29, no. 6 (December 1989): 638.
52. This organization aimed to facilitate an exchange of ideas among clinics, raise the standards of
medical practice in clinics, gain recognition for graduate medical education in group practices,
and disseminate medical knowledge pertaining to group practices. See “American Medical
Group Association History,” American Medical Group Association,
http://www.amga.org/AboutAMGA/history_aboutAMGA.asp (accessed December 26, 2008).
53. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 354.
54. Shortliffe, Hamilton, and Noroian, “The Emergency Room and the Changing Pattern of
Medical Care,” 23.
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night and during weekends.55 As patients’ personal physicians became less accessible,
they turned to the emergency room for reliable and immediate service.

Trend Towards Medical Specialization
An increase in medical specialization deemphasized the patient’s relationship
with the family doctor in two ways: it led to increasing uncertainty as to which
physicians patients should contact for an emergency and it led to an overall shortage of
GPs. In the first half of the twentieth century, the expansion of medical knowledge and
advances in medical technology led to the development of specialist societies in several
medical fields, including ophthalmology, otolaryngology, dermatology, obstetrics and
gynecology, pediatrics, radiology, and orthopedics.56 The trend toward medical
specialization accelerated after World War II. This acceleration resulted from the
financial rewards of specialization and the new image of the specialist as superior to the
general practitioner. The disparity in income between specialists and general
practitioners increased in the sixties.57 As a result of differences in insurance coverage,
hospital-based specialties like surgery offered a higher income than office-based
specialties like internal medicine.58

55. Herbert Freilich, “Variations in Census of Emergency-Room Patients,” Hospital Topics 43 (May
1965): 46.
56. For further information on the development of medical specialties in the United States, refer
to George Weisz, Divide and Conquer: A Comparative History of Medical Specialization (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
57. Ibid., 183.
58. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 358.
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The new image of the specialist provided an additional incentive to specialize.59
During World War II the military formally recognized the elevated status of specialists
by commissioning them in higher ranks than GPs.60 The medical and lay communities
viewed specialists as elite physicians who had attained mastery of their fields and were
at the forefront of new developments in academic medicine.61 GPs relied on specialists
for advice about specific medical problems and for patient referrals. The rising threat of
lawsuits in the early sixties pressured GPs to refer patients to specialists.62 Two-thirds of
physicians in the military, including many older GPs, indicated a strong desire to
become specialists after the war.63 The G.I. Bill of Rights of 1944 subsidized this
transition as thousands of doctors completed specialty training. The number of hospital
residencies rose from 9,000 in 1946 to 15,000 in 1948.64
The prevalence of hospital-based specialties increased rapidly. A 1950s study at
Cornell indicated the proportion of students planning to become GPs decreased from 60
to 16 percent between the first and fourth years of medical school, while students
planning to become specialists increased from 35 to 74 percent. Those going into
teaching and research increased from 5 to 10 percent.65 The percentage of doctors
reporting themselves as full-time specialists increased from 44 to 69 percent from 1955 to

59. Ludmerer, Time To Heal, 183.
60. Ibid., 142.
61. Weisz, Divide and Conquer, 131.
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1966. Surgical specialties increased from 26 percent to over 30 percent in the sixties.66 By
1967 only 15 percent of medical students were planning to enter general practice.67 The
medical system could accommodate these changes because the process for certifying
specialties, which had developed in the 1930s, did not regulate the size or distribution of
specialties.68 Medical specialties grew at an uncontrolled rate because of autonomy of
specialty boards and the failure of an organization to regulate specialization.69 As the
medical work force and residency programs expanded, opportunities for further
specialization arose. New positions became available for physicians in subspecialty
divisions of fields such as cardiology, gastroenterology, and endocrinology.70
The trend towards specialization deemphasized the patient’s relationship with
the family doctor. Dr. Louis Nahum, an internist in New Haven, Connecticut,
recognized that patients had a “feeling that the specialist who treated them a short time
ago is not interested in their total health problem or that he does not wish to accept
responsibility for a patient’s problem outside of his own field of interest.”71 Patients
believed that specialists were unwilling to or incapable of helping them in a field outside
of their training; as a result, they did not know which physician to contact in the case of
an emergency.72 In this new era of specialized medicine, the emergency room became
appealing because it offered patients medical care for any health problem.
66. Ibid., 359.
67. Ludmerer, Time To Heal, 187.
68. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 356.
69. Weisz, Divide and Conquer, 145.
70. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 352.
71. Nahum,“The ‘Emergency Room,’” 763.
72. Gibson, “EMS: A Facet of Ambulatory Care,” 61.
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The trend towards specialization also led to a shortage of general practitioners.
By 1964 there were only 68,000 GPs listed in the American Academy of General Practice,
down from 96,000 fifteen years earlier.73 The number of doctors in private practice
declined not only as a proportion of physicians but also in relation to the total
population: the number of GPs decreased from 76 to 50 per one hundred thousand
people from 1960 to 1965.74 Because of the decline of GPs, they became busier and less
accessible within their communities. Many physicians had long wait times – even for
patients with an appointment. Patients could often save time by going to the emergency
room. A 1969 study in Baltimore indicated the average travel time to the emergency
room was only 15.2 minutes, as compared to 17.2 minutes to a private office; the average
wait time was only 36.7 minutes, as compared to 43.7 minutes in a private office without
an appointment.75 Busier appointment schedules and longer wait times increased the
inaccessibility of physicians. Such delays in outpatient care provided an additional
incentive for patients to go the emergency room for prompt treatment of any medical
problem.

The Emergency Room Replaces the Physician’s Office as a Common Meeting Place
In the 1960s GPs started to use the emergency room as a meeting place for their
patients. Physicians chose to meet their patients in the emergency room rather than their
private offices because of the availability of better medical equipment there, the

73. John J. Goldman, “New ‘Family Doctor’ Patients With Minor Ills Jam Emergency Rooms,
Drive Up Hospital Costs,” Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1964.
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guarantee of payment from a third party, and the convenience of going to a hospital
where the patient might ultimately be admitted.76 Continuing advancements in medical
technology, including blood transfusions, the EKG machine, and cardiac catheterization,
made it difficult to treat emergencies on a house call or even in a private office. Many
private offices did not have even X-ray machines.77
One study indicated 41 percent of patient visits were “mutual convenience”
visits where a doctor met the patient in the emergency facility.78 In a 1969 study in
Baltimore, private physicians treated 30 percent of emergency patients in their office,
admitted 17 percent of patients directly to the hospital, and referred 54 percent to the
emergency room. Physician’s support of the emergency room led to increased patient
visits and encouraged patient confidence in the emergency room as the preferred facility
for medical care.79

THE NEW ROLE OF THE EMERGENCY ROOM
As a result of growing national interest in emergency care and the changing
nature of the physician-patient relationship, emergency medicine in the United States
underwent a transformation. The prosperous economy and the sociopolitical climate of
the sixties facilitated this transformation. The emergency room took on a new role in
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society as a community health center. It developed an exclusive niche within the health
care system as a place where patients had a right to be treated and insurance companies
fully covered this treatment. This occurred at a time when the government, the media,
the American public, and physician leaders pushed to improve the quality of emergency
services.
The concept of twenty-four-hour, high-quality emergency services fit well with
American cultural ideals. According to Dr. Karl Mangold, one of the first full-time
emergency physicians, “We have a ‘McDonald’s society’ that wants what it wants when
it wants it; and it wants it 24 hours a day.”80 In 1962 Dr. Vernon Abbott recognized that,
“to the public’s way of thinking, any illness is an emergency, and there is always a doctor
at the emergency department.”81 According to Mills, the public wanted emergency care
“delivered promptly, cheaply, and with all the warmth of a traditional house call.”82 The
“McDonald’s society” had decided it was time to use emergency services. The public
flooded emergency rooms for both urgent and non-urgent health problems.
As a result of this transformation, emergency rooms across the country
experienced astronomical increases in admissions.83 Regardless of size or location, all
hospitals witnessed a major increase in emergency room use, disproportionate to
increases in the use of other hospital facilities. From 1954 to 1973, the number of
hospitals increased by 14 percent, hospital beds by 56 percent, hospital admissions by 60
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81. Vernon C. Abbott, “Attending Doctors Staff Emergency Room,” Modern Hospital 98 (June
1962): 77-78.
82. James D. Mills, “Emergency Medicine, 1947-1987: A PGM Retrospective,” Postgraduate
Medicine 81, no. 3 (February 15, 1987): 82.
83. Refer to Figure 2, Figure 3, and Table 2 in Appendix 1.

28
percent, and inpatient days by 41 percent – but visits to the emergency room increased
by 380 percent.84 A second study indicated emergency room visits increased 205 percent
between 1954 and 1965; the bulk of this growth occurred at local and state hospitals
rather than voluntary hospitals. After 1965 emergency visits rose at a slower rate,
increasing only 49 percent in the next five years.85 A third study revealed an increase of
120 percent in emergency service visits from 1945 to 1958, a growth rate that was
approximately double that of hospital admissions at these institutions.86
An increase in non-urgent visits to the emergency room drove the rise in patient
load. A 1964 study at Genesee Hospital in Rochester, New York, indicated that less than
one in six patients seen in the emergency room were sick enough to be admitted to the
hospital. One-third of visits were non-urgent, one-third could be treated in 24 hours but
did not need immediate care, and one-third were true emergencies.87 According to a
1964 survey by the ACS, only 45 percent of emergency room visits constituted true
emergencies.88 One study estimated that 42 percent of cases were non-urgent; this was
similar to the 38 percent reported at Boston’s Beth Israel Hospital.89 Similar rates of nonurgent visits were reported at hospitals in Hartford, Pittsburgh, Newark, and New
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Haven.90 Because of the increase in non-urgent visits, the proportion of surgical cases
decreased. The number of accident patients, which had formerly constituted the
majority of patients, represented only one-third of emergency patients by the early
sixties.91 Sixty percent of emergency room patients were medical and pediatric cases.92
Increased use of the emergency room exacerbated the existing shortages of space,
equipment, and personnel.93 Faced with these new challenges and mounting public
criticism, hospitals devised innovative solutions in order to improve emergency
services. The new staffing methods that began at small community hospitals sparked the
development of emergency medicine as a specialty.
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4
Advances in Military Medicine Revolutionize Emergency
Medical Care

As the emergency room took on a central role in society, medical advances
simultaneously spurred the development of a new specialty. Successful innovations in
pre-hospital, trauma, and coronary care distinguished the field of emergency medicine
and created a new purpose for the emergency room: to provide care for patients in the
transition period between pre-hospital care and coronary care. As research progressed, it
became increasingly important to improve the quality and efficiency of emergency care
in order to increase the chances of patient survival. By the end of the sixties, the
emergency room had established its new role as a critical, intermediate link in the chain
of urgent medical services.

MILITARY ADVANCEMENTS IN PRE-HOSPITAL CARE
The military developed the earliest systems of pre-hospital care, which yielded
astounding results. After advances in pre-hospital and trauma care during the Korean
and Vietnam wars, physicians implemented these concepts back home. Unlike the
military’s emergency medical care, which developed as a comprehensive, integrated
system, civilian pre-hospital and trauma systems developed sporadically across the
country. These developments enabled more patients to reach the hospital alive and
placed increased pressure on the emergency room to deliver high-quality care.
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Advances in patient transport began two centuries ago with the idea that
wounded soldiers should be transported off the field before the battle ended. In 1759
French army surgeon Baron Percy established a corps of field litter-bearers to transport
the wounded from the battlefield.94 In 1797 Baron Dominique-Jean Larrey, the chief
physician of Napoleon’s army, improved on this idea: he designed horse-drawn carts
manned by drivers, corpsmen, and litter-bearers to transport the wounded to field aid
stations. These carts were called “ambulances volantes” or “flying ambulances.”95
The United States lagged behind France in the development of patient transport
on the battlefield. The Union Army had only two ambulances at the beginning of the
Civil War.96 The First Ambulance Corps was developed in 1864 upon the
recommendation of Major Jonathan Letterman. By the end of the war, horse-drawn
ambulances regularly transported the wounded from the battlefield.97 Motorized
ambulances replaced horse-drawn ambulances in World War I.98 During the Korean and
Vietnam wars, the US Army developed rapid transport systems for the wounded in
order to minimize delays to definitive therapy. The first helicopter ambulance unit came
into service in 1951, and helicopters were used to a limited extent during the Korean
War.99 Air evacuation was further refined in Vietnam due to rough terrain and the lack
94. Ellen M. McKenny, “History of the Motorized Ambulance Transport,” Military Medicine 132
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98. Katharyn Kennedy et al., “Triage: Techniques and Applications in Decisionmaking,” 137.
99. Miller, “A Brief Military History of Today’s EMS,” 148; Spurgeon Neel, Medical Support of the
U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965-1970 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973): 59.
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of a secured road network; air medevac missions skyrocketed from 13,000 to 206,000 in
the years from 1965 to 1969.100 Such improvements in transportation directly translated
to reduced time to definitive treatment. In World War I it took an average of ten hours
for a patient to receive definitive treatment. In the Korean War this was reduced to five
hours. This process culminated during the Vietnam War when the newly developed
evacuation system reduced the time to one or two hours.101
In addition to establishing emergent patient transport, the military was the first
to develop medical triage. Larrey developed the first organized system of emergency
care: he instituted a triage system where the wounded were treated based on medical
condition rather than rank.102 The US army first used a triage system during the Civil
War. The United States Army Medical Corps refined this approach in World War II by
creating create a tiered triage system that included medics who initiated treatment in the
field.103 In Vietnam War the US Army developed a more sophisticated triage system.
Although it was difficult to implement this system in Vietnam’s rough terrain, it
provided the backbone for emergency medical care in the military.104 At the line of
combat, trained medics provided care and initiated the evacuation process. In the
helicopter, medical aid men continued emergency care and conducted an in-flight
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evaluation.105 Based on this evaluation, patients were taken either to a battalion clearing
station for minor injuries or further resuscitation or to a mobile surgical hospital for
definitive treatment of complex injuries. Patients expected to return to duty within sixty
days were transported to general hospitals outside of the combat zone for surgery,
medical treatment, or psychiatric treatment. Patients not expected to return within sixty
days were transported to hospitals in the United States.106
In addition to developing triage systems, the Army also provided immediate
emergency care in fully staffed, well-equipped mobile surgical hospitals. Mobile field
surgical detachments first appeared in World War II and were used extensively during
the Korean War. These hospitals treated hemorrhagic and traumatic shock promptly and
efficiently. Mobile army surgical hospital (MASH) units were equipped to treat urgent
surgical cases; they consisted of 60 to 200 beds and were staffed with sixteen officers,
twelve nurses, and ninety-five enlisted personnel.107 The first Medical Unit SelfContained, Transportable (MUST) became operational in 1966 during the Vietnam
War.108 The MUST was a fixed surgical hospital used on the front lines for rapid
stabilization of the wounded. It consisted of three units that could be transported by
truck or helicopter. A turbine engine supplied electricity for lighting, air conditioning,
refrigeration, and hot water. Other inflatable elements provided laboratory, X-ray,
pharmacy, dental, and kitchen facilities.109
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The US Army also established the broad-scale use of blood transfusions and
promoted trauma research. These advances further improved emergency care. The US
Army first transfused blood during World War I.110 During World War II each US field
army established a blood program; in the last thirteen months of the war, the US sent
half a million units of blood from the US to Europe and the Pacific.111 In Vietnam the
military blood program operated for ten years. Blood transfusions were completed
during helicopter transport and occasionally before the helicopter even arrived.112
Between 1965 and 1971, the US Army sent 1.3 million units of blood to Vietnam and the
US military hospitals administered approximately 600,000 units.113 Increased use of
blood transfusions in Vietnam was a major factor that led to the success of resuscitative
efforts.
The US Army also made important contributions to trauma research. In the fifties
and sixties the Army made advancements in treatment for burn victims at the Burn
Treatment Center at Ft. Sam Houston in Texas. They also developed the concept of
disseminated intravascular coagulation and studied its importance with regard to shock
and trauma.114 Military surgical research units in Saigon and Da Nang investigated the
indications and effects of blood transfusion.115 Surgical teams at the 3rd Surgical Hospital

110. J.R. Hess and M.J.G. Thomas, “Blood Use in War and Disaster: Lessons from the Past
Century,” Transfusion 43, no. 11 (November 2003): 1622.
111. Ibid., 1623. For more information on the US military blood program in World War II refer to
Douglas B. Kendrick, Blood Program in World War II (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General,
Department of the Army), 1964.
112. Neel, Medical Support, 49.
113. Hess and Thomas, “Blood Use in War and Disaster,” 1623.
114. Hardaway, “Contributions of Army Medicine to Civilian Medicine,” 410.
115. Eiseman, “Combat Casualty Management in Vietnam,” 54.

35
and the US Army Hospital in Zama, Japan, studied resuscitation procedures, acute
pulmonary edema, and war wounds.116
The success of advances in patient transport, triage, and trauma care was
striking. The most effective developments were rapid helicopter evacuation, the use of
resuscitation techniques during transport, and the successful treatment of shock at
mobile surgical hospitals. As a result of these developments, patient outcomes improved
significantly. Deaths as a percent of hits decreased from 29.3 percent in World War II to
26.3 percent in Korea to 19 percent in Vietnam. Several other statistics, including
survival rate, case fatality rate, return-to-duty rate, and length of hospital stay, also
demonstrated the success of these improvements in emergency medical care.117

MILITARY ADVANCEMENTS ARE APPLIED TO CIVILIAN MEDICINE
Military advancements in pre-hospital and trauma care led to the establishment
of an organized, comprehensive system of emergency medical care. Initially, it was
difficult to apply these concepts to civilian medicine because the infrastructure for such
a system did not exist. Early advancements in transport, triage, and trauma care only
occurred sporadically at the local level. National and statewide efforts arose to
coordinate these services in the seventies.
Upon their return to the United States, many former military surgeons noted
how far civilian pre-hospital and trauma care lagged behind military medicine. Dr. Ben
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Eiseman, a military surgeon who served as a consultant to the US forces in Vietnam,
emphasized this point:
Wounded in the remote jungle or rice paddy of Vietnam, an American citizen has
a better chance for quick, definitive surgical care by board certified specialists
than were he hit on a highway near his hometown in the continental United
States. Even if he were struck immediately outside the emergency room of most
United States hospitals rarely would he be given such prompt, expert operative
care as routinely is furnished from the site of combat wounding in Vietnam. The
concentration and organization of the medical manpower and equipment
necessary to achieve such a level of care half-way around the world from the
United States is awesome.118
Because of improvements in emergency medical care, the United States lost only 58,000
lives over the twelve years of the Vietnam War.119 By contrast, there were 116,000 fatal
accidents in the United States in 1969 alone.120

EMS Systems
Civilian EMS systems were a direct outgrowth of the earlier wartime advances in
transport, triage, and trauma care. However, the development of civilian EMS was
delayed due to the lack of a proper infrastructure to support these services. Prior to 1960
EMS systems were largely unregulated and disorganized; hospitals, fire departments,
volunteer groups, and undertakers provided services at the local level.121 EMS systems
started in the states of Illinois and Maryland and the cities of Seattle, Miami, Los
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Angeles, Portland, and Columbus, Ohio, towards the end of the decade and began to
spread across the country in the seventies. EMS systems played an integral role in the
development of emergency medicine. By keeping more patients alive on the way to the
hospital, effective EMS systems put increasing pressure on hospitals to improve
emergency room care. The development of EMS systems also distinguished the clinical
field of emergency medicine from other specialties.
Urban ambulance systems first emerged in the US in second half of the 19th
century, primarily as a result of military experiences in Europe and America. Prior to
ambulances, people walked to hospitals or used a variety of transportation vehicles
including omnibus drivers, litters, pushcarts, delivery wagons, private sedans, hirechairs, gigs, flys, and cabs. The Commercial Hospital in Cincinnati introduced the first
ambulance service associated with a hospital in 1865.122 The ACS also contributed to the
early development of ambulance services: as early as the twenties they made
recommendations to examine the principles transportation and ambulance equipment.123
Ambulance services were mainly hospital-based until World War II, when these services
were eliminated due to the departure of personnel and a poor economy. According to
Dr. David Boyd, a general surgeon who served as National Director of Emergency
Medical Services in the late seventies, during World War II “the ambulances went to
hell.”124 Untrained, unlicensed individuals who owned hearses, station wagons, or other
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back-loading vehicles provided transportation to hospitals.125 Dr. Edward B. Dalton,
Sanitary Superintendent of the New York City Metropolitan Board of Health,
established the first city ambulance system in conjunction with Bellevue Hospital in
1869.126
The concept of EMTs also emerged from the Vietnam War, where medical aid
men had been trained to provide medical care at the line of combat. According to Dr.
Peter Rosen, founder of one of the first emergency medicine residency programs in the
country at the University Chicago, “much of the impetus for the development of
ancillary medical personnel came from war experiences that demonstrated that military
corpsmen would successfully master and practice sophisticated technical tasks.”127
When the Vietnam War ended, military medics returned home and provided the
country with a new work force that was well trained and experienced in emergency
care.128 Consistent with this trend, the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, the
American Heart Association, and the ACS developed curricula and initiated physicianrun programs for ambulance drivers.129 In 1969 cardiologist Dr. Leonard Cobb worked
with Gordon Vickery, Chief of the Seattle Fire Department, to develop one of the first
paramedic training programs for firefighters. This effort came to be known as Medic
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One. In 1971 the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians was established
with the aim of providing national criteria for EMT training. The following year, they
worked with AMA and the American Association of Junior Colleges to publish
guidelines for a two-year associate degree program for EMTs.130
Organized EMS systems started to develop across the country in the sixties. A
1965 study indicated that 200 of 900 cities had an ordinance regulating ambulance
service. Of those with ordinances, 162 required an attendant in addition to the driver,
and 174 required the equipment listed by the ACS Committee on Trauma.131
Government legislation further facilitated the development of regional EMS systems.
The Federal Highway Safety Act of 1966 contained national standards for emergency
medical services and provided for the allocation of a percentage of each state’s highway
funds to safety, which included emergency health services.132 Many states used this
funding to purchase ambulances that met national standards. The EMS Systems Act of
1973 promoted the development of comprehensive regional EMS systems by authorizing
HEW to make categorical grants for that purpose and establishing the Interagency
Committee on EMS. A total of $300 million was allocated to set up EMS systems across
the country from 1974 to 1981.133
As EMS systems evolved, there was increasing pressure to improve patient care
in the emergency room because more and more patients survived the trip to the
hospital. According to Dr. Karl Mangold, one of the first full-time emergency physicians,
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“patients who were previously dead in the streets or in the bedrooms are now coming
into the emergency department alive and sometimes salvageable.”134 As physicians
became increasingly invested in pre-hospital care, the emergency services at hospitals
attracted greater attention among the medical community.

Triage and Trauma Systems
As EMS systems became more advanced, hospitals simultaneously developed
medical triage systems. Although the concept was similar to that of military medicine,
the implementation of triage in the civilian world occurred on a hospital-by-hospital
basis. Yale-New Haven Hospital was one of the first hospitals to develop a triage
system. An article in Medical News praised the new medical triage system as a great
success.135 Another article in Time entitled “Curing the Emergency Room” discussed
successful triage systems at Cook County Hospital in Chicago and Beekman Downtown
Hospital in New York City.136
Dr. R. Adams Cowley helped solve the problem of coordinating efforts between
EMS systems and receiving hospitals. As an army surgeon in France during World War
II, he discovered that the time to treatment was critical for shock patients. This discovery
spurred many of the improvements in transport, triage, and trauma care that occurred
during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Cowley had a vision of “MASH-like trauma care”
for the state of Maryland.137 In 1961 he founded a two-room Clinical Shock Trauma
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Research Unit at the University of Maryland. Eight years later, with the financial
support of the National Institute of Health, a new Shock Trauma Center was
constructed. The trauma center provided immediate, comprehensive treatment of
trauma patients that included resuscitation, stabilization, definitive care, and
rehabilitation.138 It was equipped with a blood bank, lab, operating room, and surgical
and support staff. Helicopters funded by the Department of Transportation provided
statewide patient transport. Similar progress took place in Illinois, where Dr. David
Boyd and Dr. Bruce Flashner, former head of the Trauma and Emergency Service a Cook
County Hospital, implemented a statewide system of emergency medical care.139 By
1974 they had created a sophisticated EMS system that included paramedic training, a
network of state-designated trauma centers, radio communication, ambulance and
helicopter transportation, and a trauma registry for evaluating hospital performance.140

Research in Trauma and Coronary Care Continues
The development of hospital-based trauma care systems was accompanied by
further advancements in emergency medical research in the areas of resuscitation and
cardiac care. Anesthesiologist Dr. Peter Safar and respiratory researcher Dr. James Elam
advocated for mouth-to-mouth resuscitation in the fifties.141 By 1966 Dr. Safar had
started a one-year fellowship in resuscitology for intensive care units, recovery rooms,
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and emergency rooms at the University of Pittsburgh.142 Even earlier Dr. Rudolph Noer,
Chairman of the Department of Surgery at the University of Louisville, articulated the
new role of the emergency department as a place for resuscitation and stabilization prior
to surgery.143
Mobile cardiac care units (CCUs) emerged in during the era of open-heart
surgery, cardiac catheterization, organ transplant, renal dialysis, the heart-lung machine,
the EKG machine, and mechanical ventilators.144 Although mobile CCUs were not part
of the ER, they highlighted the importance of emergent diagnosis and stabilization of
heart patients. In 1966 Dr. Frank Pantridge and Dr. John Geddes of Belfast, Ireland,
established the first mobile CCU, which consisted of an ambulance with specialized
equipment and dedicated staff to provide pre-hospital cardiac care.145 Dr. William Grace
initiated the first mobile CCU in the US at St. Vincent’s Hospital in Manhattan two years
later.146 Studies demonstrated a decrease in hospital mortality rates from 35 to 20 percent
with the advent of CCUs.147
Because emergency rooms had previously been used to treat accident victims,
they remained surgically oriented; this often made it difficult for patients with chest
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pain to get treated quickly and efficiently.148 Cardiologist Dr. William Likoff at
Hahnemann Hospital published a 1972 article that highlighted ineffective emergency
care as an obstacle to rapid treatment during a heart attack:
The delay to which a patient usually is subjected in…the emergency room of a
hospital is a common cause for treatment failures in the pre-hospital care of the
patient with an acute myocardial infarction. It often evolves from errors in
judgment on the part of the triage officer as to who commands priority of
attention. It may also result from inefficiency in mobilizing the proper personnel
and equipment required to reach a diagnostic conclusion.149
The advances in coronary care provided the emergency room with a new medical
purpose: the resuscitation and stabilization of cardiac patients. These developments
increased pressure on hospitals to improve the efficiency of emergency services.

A NEW FIELD: EMERGENCY MEDICINE
According to otologist Dr. George Shambaugh, “the idea of investigation…is
fundamental in the conception of the real specialist” and the true specialist “must
identify himself with scientific medicine and win his spurs by making some real
contribution to medical science.”150 Advances in pre-hospital, trauma, and cardiac care
established a field of new clinical knowledge that pertained directly to emergency
medicine. This knowledge also created a new role for the emergency room as an
intermediate, critical link between EMS systems and CCUs. As a result of these
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developments, it became increasingly important for emergency physicians to diagnose
patients quickly and accurately and to effectively expand the role of the emergency
room beyond that of the obsolete accident room.
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5
Hospitals Restructure Emergency Services

The transformation of the emergency room into a community health center and
the advances in pre-hospital and trauma care put increasing pressure on hospitals to
improve emergency services. In the 1960s hospitals encountered many obstacles that
influenced their approaches to these issues. Many hospitals were left without adequate
manpower, especially for emergency services, due to a nationwide house staff shortage.
To complicate matters, house staff became increasingly resistant to working in the
emergency room (ER). Physicians were also reluctant to work in the ER as they entered
new specialty and subspecialty fields and as the variety and magnitude of medical
problems in the ER expanded. Because of these challenges, hospital administrators
developed new strategies to deal with the rising patient volumes and to improve the
quality and efficiency of patient care. Urban academic centers made structural and
administrative changes to their emergency departments while small community
hospitals brought new, full-time leadership into their emergency departments. These
changes led to nationwide reorganization of emergency medical care in the hospital.

HOUSE STAFF RESIST WORKING IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM
There was a severe house staff shortage in most hospitals across the country in
the early sixties. This shortage occurred because hospitals, residency programs, and
medical specialties expanded while medical school enrollment did not. In 1957 hospitals
were looking for more than 12,000 interns annually, but American medical schools were
graduating fewer than 7,000 students a year. By the 1960s surgery was the only field that
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maintained a pyramidal structure for residency; other specialties in need of manpower
permitted all physicians who were admitted to the program to complete residency. By
the late sixties 20 percent of approved residency positions were unfilled even though 32
percent of interns and residents were graduates of foreign medical schools.151 This
shortage made it difficult for hospitals to staff medical services, especially emergency
services, which relied on residents from other departments. To further exacerbate the
house staff shortage, there was a temporary shortage of foreign physicians due to new
educational requirements: the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates
instituted an exam for foreign physicians in 1958. The number of foreign medical
graduates in the US had increased from 2000 to 9000, or from 10 to 26 percent of house
staff, in the fifties.152 The shortage of house staff and foreign physicians in the sixties
made it especially difficult for community hospitals, where residency positions were less
desirable as compared to teaching hospitals, to staff the emergency department.
House officers were signing antiwar petitions, joining marches, and participating
in demonstrations in the sixties. The spirit of these protests spread to the professional
arena: they started to protest resident salaries, the lack of ancillary personnel, and the
poor working conditions. Residents made the first step towards unionization by
establishing the Committee of Interns and Residents in New York City in 1958. By 1972
house staff associations had developed at 70 percent of hospitals with graduate training
programs and 81 percent of hospitals run by local and state governments. Hospitals felt
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increasing pressure to improve the conditions for house staff because of the stiff
competition for resident manpower.153
One of the house staff’s major complaints was working in the ER. As other
specialist residents left the ER, the general medicine and surgery residents increasingly
resisted working there. According to Rosen, “the residents in other specialties didn’t
want to do emergency medicine…they resented that they had to take care of these everincreasing numbers of patients without supervision.”154 Many surgical residents were
spending up to eighteen months of their surgical residency running the emergency
department. In the early seventies, the surgical residents at the University of Chicago
rebelled: they refused to go back to the ER for second tours. This left the hospital
without sufficient manpower to run the ER.155

PHYSICIANS RESIST WORKING IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM
Due to increasing specialization, physicians resisted working in the emergency
department. Many specialists, including pathologists, radiologists, dermatologists, and
psychiatrists, had almost no clinical experience beyond medical school; as soon as some
specialists were excused from mandatory emergency room duty, other specialists felt
they had a right to be excused.156 Furthermore, as the composition of emergency room
visits shifted from injuries to medical cases, it became increasingly important for
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physicians in the emergency room to differentiate quickly and efficiently the acutely ill
patients from those with non-emergent problems.
At the same time that physicians’ resistance to working in the ER increased,
many physicians who had served in the military returned to the US with a new belief
that emergency care should be provided by experts. Of students admitted to medical
school during the war, 55 percent were under contract to the army, 25 percent to the
navy, and 20 percent for civilian service.157 Wartime advances in emergency care
contributed to a perception that emergency care should be provided by well-trained,
experienced physicians. Dr. Phelan, a surgeon at the University of Wisconsin, believed
that “the experiences gained during World War II and the Korean campaign…indicate
the value of an experienced physician who is primarily concerned in directing the
management of injured and acutely ill patients. The similarity of practice under wartime
and disaster conditions is comparable to many present-day emergency room
services.”158 The landmark article Accidental Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of
Modern Society declared that there was a need for emergency care training “of a caliber
commensurate with that attained by only a few individuals in active military field units
caring for combat casualties.”159 The military experiences of many doctors contributed to
the growing perception that a new clinical niche was forming: emergency medicine.
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A NEW IDEA: PHYSICIAN GROUPS STAFF THE EMERGENCY ROOM
Confronted with patient complaints, staffing difficulties, rising patient volumes,
and continuing advances in pre-hospital and coronary care, hospitals were forced to
devise solutions to the ER problem. Prior to these changes in emergency room
management, leadership in the ER varied across the country. Many community
hospitals staffed the ER with nurses who performed triage and contacted physicians as
needed. Other hospitals staffed the emergency room with no one at all, aging or
impaired physicians, or foreign graduates.160 Some hospitals staffed the ER with
physicians who volunteered on a rotating basis. Frederick Memorial Hospital set up a
rotating call system in which three surgeons rotated through ER call for one month as
early as the 1930s.161 Physicians who rotated on a weekly basis staffed the emergency
room at MacNeal Memorial Hospital in Illinois.162 At St. Luke’s Hospital in Wisconsin,
twenty-nine physicians volunteered to be on call one out of twenty-nine days.163
Academic hospitals typically staffed the ER with medical students and residents in
surgery, medicine, and pediatrics; attending physicians only came down to the ER as
needed.164
In order to address the problem of increased patient load, hospital administrators
considered several options. A new concept – that attending physicians should supervise
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the ER on a full-time basis, even in the presence of house staff – emerged in the
literature. As early as 1958, Phelan had the foresight to note that due to increased use of
the ER, it would have to be staffed by full-time physicians in order to ensure adequate
care and management of patients.165 With regard to the qualifications of these
physicians, Phelan recommended that they be “experienced” and “primarily concerned
in directing the management of injured and acutely ill patients.”166 Dr. James Cross, a
physician at Community Memorial General Hospital in La Grange, Illinois,
recommended selecting staff members interested in emergency care and rotating them
through the ER for one-week periods in hospitals with house staff or for 24-hour periods
in hospitals without house staff.167 He insisted that a physician be available at all times
in the ER and that house staff contact the attending physician before initiating definitive
therapy.168 Frances Ginsberg, a nurse at Boston’s New England Center Hospital,
emphasized that it was important for senior staff physicians to supervise interns and
residents appropriately.169 In 1968 the American Society of Anesthesiologists
recommended that a physician be assigned to the emergency room at all times and that
every patient entering the ER be seen by a physician within fifteen minutes; they also
required that ER physicians be “experienced in acute medicine” and fill a new

165. John T. Phelan, “Some Responsibilities of the Physician in the Care of the Emergency Room
Patient,” The Journal – Lancet 78, no. 12 (December 1958): 509.
166. Ibid.
167. James H. Cross, “Medical Economics: The Hospital Emergency Room,” Illinois Medical
Journal 118 (October 1960): 248.
168. Ibid.
169. Frances Ginsberg, “Effective Emergency Room Needs Adequate Staff, Patient Screening,”
Modern Hospital 104 (May 1965): 150.

51
occupational niche by supervising intensive care and resuscitation programs in hospitals
and within the community.170
New staffing models that provided full-time attending coverage in the ER served
as the impetus for the development of a new medical specialty and ultimately became
the gold standard for ER management in hospitals across the country. Each hospital
developed its own approach to improve emergency services based on the needs of the
community and the goals of the hospital administration. Community hospitals were the
first to implement new staffing methods that relied on full-time emergency physicians.
In Alexandria Hospital, full-time emergency physicians became the primary emergency
care providers and replaced nurses, house staff, and other physicians in managing the
ER. These physicians filled a new clinical niche. Although many had been general
practitioners in their communities, they relinquished their private practices to work in
the hospital on a full-time basis. Unlike most full-time medical faculty, however, they
did not engage in clinical research or associate with a particular hospital-based specialty.
As Zink portrays them in Anyone, Anytime, Anything: A History of Emergency Medicine,
they were individuals who enjoyed working in the emergency room and who were
committed to improving the quality of emergency medical care in their communities.171
These physicians later emerged as leaders in emergency medicine and played a pivotal
role in fighting to gain recognition as specialists. Their national presence reinforced the
growing sentiment within the medical community that experts in emergency care were
needed.
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In spite of the growing concerns about inadequate resident supervision,
academic hospitals did not change their staffing methods significantly in the sixties.
These hospitals instituted triage systems and established ambulatory care facilities in
order to accommodate an increasing patient load, and they continued to use house staff
to run the ER. Such changes temporarily enabled teaching hospitals to function
adequately without relying on full-time emergency physicians. This delayed the entry of
emergency physicians into academic medicine, and ultimately delayed the development
of emergency medicine as a specialty. In later years academic hospitals adopted the
staffing methods of smaller hospitals and began providing full-time supervision of
residents in the ER.

THE BEGINNING OF A NEW MEDICAL SPECIALTY
At a national level emergency medicine was at the brink of evolution. The
emergency room was fast becoming a community health center and a critical link in the
chain of urgent medical services. Advances in pre-hospital and coronary care raised the
standards for emergency care and stimulated further research. Hospital administrators
restructured their emergency services in response to the growing needs and expectations
of the public. In spite of these advances, emergency medicine was a long way from
meeting the standards of a medical specialty.
A formalized process for approving specialties first developed in the thirties as a
response to the proliferation of medical specialties. This process required that a medical
board obtain approval from the AMA Council on Medical Education and the Advisory
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Board for Medical Specialties in order to achieve specialty status.172 These two
organizational bodies established detailed requirements to regulate specialty formation.
According to the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), which replaced the
Advisory Board in 1970, these requirements included (1) differentiation of a new
specialty based on major new concepts in medical science (2) representation of a distinct,
well-defined field of medical practice (3) the ability of physicians to demonstrate special
knowledge and capability in the field (4) establishment of a plan for developing a
training program in graduate medical education and (5) satisfactory evidence that the
proposal has broad professional support.173 Once a medical board had attained specialty
status, specialists were required to complete three years of training after internship and
then to obtain certification by a recognized board.174 The specialty certification process
drove a new trend: the replacement of part-time specialists with full-time specialists.
Because of the extensive training requirements for board certification, it became less
practical to work as a part-time specialist. As more doctors became board certified, the
number of part-time specialists decreased. The majority of specialists practiced part-time
in the 1920s, but by 1945 there was only a small portion of part-time specialists.175
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Emergency medicine started to fulfill the ABMS requirements in the sixties.
Although a specific area of medical knowledge had not yet been delineated, emergency
medicine started to differentiate based on new concepts of pre-hospital, trauma, and
coronary care. And although emergency physicians had not yet formed a medical board,
they started to practice on a full-time basis. This was a major achievement: by
establishing the role of the full-time emergency physician before gaining specialty
status, emergency physicians entered the house of medicine through the back door.
They did not complete the process of specialty recognition in the traditional fashion, by
first forming a specialty board and then establishing graduate education programs that
would expand the professional base of the specialty. Instead, they first established a
broad base of support then developed graduate education programs, and lastly fought
the political battles to gain the specialty status and to establish accredited residency
training programs at academic institutions.176 The development of the specialty started
at the local level. Alexandria, Hartford, and Yale-New Haven hospitals provide useful
case studies to better understand this developmental process, since each hospital’s
approach to emergency medicine influenced the specialty in a different way.

176. The first residency program was established in 1970, nine years before the American Board
of Emergency Medicine was recognized as a conjoint board and nineteen years before it was
recognized as a primary board.
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6
Emergency Medicine Begins in a Small Community Hospital

ALEXANDRIA HOSPITAL
Alexandria Hospital in Alexandria, Virginia, was the first hospital in the country
to institute a formalized system of emergency room staffing with a group of full-time
physicians. Dr. James Mills, President of the Medical Staff at Alexandria Hospital,
created this staffing method in response to rising patient volumes and mounting
criticism of emergency services. The Alexandria Plan (as it came to be known) won
national attention as a great success. After its institution in 1961, community hospitals
across the country developed similar models for their emergency departments. By
facilitating the emergence of full-time emergency physicians, this staffing method
directly contributed to the development of emergency medicine as a specialty.
Alexandria, a town located just outside of Washington, D.C., had a population of
approximately 91,000 in 1960.177 The Alexandria Hospital had 190 beds and 10,500
admissions.178 There were 18,000 annual visits to the emergency room. 179 According to
nurse Jane Pinson, who started working at Alexandria Hospital in the early sixties, the
emergency room only had three beds: two stretchers in one room and an ob-gyn bed

177. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1790-1980 (Washington, DC:
Bureau of the Census), http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/index.htm
(accessed December 22, 2008).
178. Zink, Anyone, Anything, Anytime, 30.
179. James D. Mills, “A Method of Staffing a Community Hospital Emergency Department,”
Virginia Medical Monthly 90 (October 1963): 518.
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across the hall. It was located in the basement of the hospital.180 The hospital cared for a
considerable number of trauma cases because of its proximity to US Route 1 and a
dangerous area of downtown Alexandria. According to Pinson, it was not uncommon
“for a stabbing or a gunshot wound to stumble through the door…we saw a lot of
that…we had a lot of accidents, a lot of pedestrians being hit off the US Route 1…a lot of
trauma…a lot of medicine.”181
Before the institution of the Alexandria Plan, nurses managed the ER on a
twenty-four-hour basis. They performed triage by scheduling outpatient appointments
and calling house staff or physicians as necessary.182 The physicians, who volunteered to
cover the ER for a day, took call from their offices. Nurses often had difficulty getting
hold of them. Many physicians waited until they had seen all of their office patients
before returning a nurse’s call in the ER. According to Cutler, nurses generally “urged
patients to wait until their family physician could take care of the emergency.”183
Additionally, the EMS system in Alexandria was not well organized at this time;
transportation consisted of old Cadillac hearses that were used as ambulances, and the
fire department ran the rescue squad.184

180. Jane Pinson, telephone interview by author, December 29, 2008. Jane Pinson started working
at Alexandria Hospital as a nursing student in 1961. She worked in the emergency department at
Alexandria Hospital for thirty-eight years, from 1964 to 2002, and currently works in endoscopy
at Inova Alexandria Hospital.
181. Ibid.
182. James D. Mills, “The Alexandria Plan,” in Emergency Department: A Handbook for the Medical
Staff (Chicago: American Medical Association, Department of Hospitals and Medical Facilities,
1966), 17.
183. Ann Cutler, “Lives Imperiled By Ambulance Services,” chap. 7 in Four Minutes To Life (New
York: Cowles Book Co., 1970), 108.
184. Mills, “A Method of Staffing a Community Hospital Emergency Department,” 518.
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Patient Use of the Emergency Room Increases
Emergency visits at Alexandria Hospital increased due to two factors: population
growth and the expansion of health insurance coverage for federal employees.
Alexandria experienced strong population growth in the sixties.185 From 1950 to 1970,
Alexandria’s population increased by 80 percent.186 With the expansion of the federal
government in 1961, the number of federal employees increased and many new
government workers moved to Alexandria. Executive branch civilian employment
increased from 1.8 million to 1.9 million from 1960 to 1962. By the end of the decade the
number of federal government employees had increased to 2.3 million, the highest
number since the end of World War II.187
Population migration to the suburbs further increased Alexandria’s population.
In the town district where Alexandria Hospital was located, the population grew by 506
percent in the sixties.188 Neighboring districts experienced similar population growth of
89, 195, and 896 percent. The other districts in Alexandria had less significant population
changes, ranging from –27 to +35 percent.189 The proximity of the hospital may have

185. Refer to Figure 4 and Table 3 in Appendix 1.
186. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999,
prepared by the Population Division (Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census, 11 April 2000),
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt (accessed December 22, 2008).
187. U.S. Bureau of the Census, “No. HS-50 Federal Government – Employment: 1901 to 2002,” in
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003 (Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census, 2003),
www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-50.pdf (accessed December 28, 2008).
188. The population increased from 2,719 in 1960 to 16,483 in 1970. See Department of Planning
and Regional Affairs, 1970 Population Highlights and Analysis, 4.
189. Ibid.
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encouraged patients in these surrounding districts to use the ER rather than a private
physician, particularly for non-urgent visits.
The middle-class population in Alexandria was directly affected by the
expansion of health insurance. The median family income in Alexandria was $7000, well
above the national and state levels of $5000, in 1960. Furthermore, Alexandria’s
population increase from 1950 to 1962 can be primarily attributed to an increase in
employed persons: unemployed persons remained close to 1000, while employed
persons increased from 24,000 to 37,000.190 The Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program established on 1 July 1960 provided hospital and major health insurance
coverage for federal employees. It offered twenty-eight plans, with fifteen available in
the Washington, D.C., area; twenty-one health maintenance organizations, as well as
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, established plans in the program.191 By 1964 the total
program enrollment was 2.1 million.192 These health plans provided many government
workers in Alexandria with health insurance coverage for ER visits.
The growth of the medically insured population in Alexandria contributed to
increased use of the ER. Emergency visits increased by 3 percent annually in the
sixties.193 Although this can be partly attributed to a population increase, it was also due
to an increase in non-urgent emergency visits. According to Mills the primary reason for

190. Annual Report: Alexandria, A Dynamic City (Alexandria, VA: Planning and Urban Renewal
Department, 1963), Alexandria Library Local History/Special Collections, Alexandria, VA, 8.
191. Karl Polzer, “The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: What Lessons Can It Offer
Policymakers?” Issue Brief National Health Policy Forum 12, no. 715 (12 March 1998): 2.
192. Andrew E. Ruddock, “Federal Employees Health Benefits Program I. History and Future of
the Federal Program – 1964,” American Journal of Public Health Nations Health 56, no. 1 (January
1966): 51.
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this increase was that patients had begun to use the emergency department as a
“community medical center…at any hour of the day or night.”194

Hospital Pressured to Improve Emergency Services
A house staff shortage and mounting patient criticism exacerbated the problems
of patient overload in the ER. In the late 1950s the hospital experienced a staffing
shortage, primarily due to the increasing demands on foreign physicians. Additionally,
because the hospital was not affiliated with an academic institution, it had particular
difficulty attracting house staff to its training programs. In 1958 the hospital had nine
residents and no interns to fill twenty positions in the emergency room.195
The local population also stimulated change. Patients complained about long
wait times and about being turned away when their complaints were not serious
enough. They also complained about the difficulties in communicating with foreign
house staff.196 According to Cutler, “Patients had to wait in a corridor and complained
bitterly about long delays in obtaining treatment or of being brusquely dismissed if their
illnesses or injuries didn’t appear serious enough to merit treatment.”197 As a result, the
medical staff and hospital directors became “increasingly concerned about the hospital’s
public image.”198 Simultaneously, local competition for patients was tightening: Fairfax
was constructing a new hospital scheduled to open in 1961.

194. Edlich, “Development of a Modern Emergency Medical Service System,” 62.
195. Stanly Ferber, “Practice Limited to the Emergency Room,” Medical Economics, July 15, 1963,
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196. Mills, “The Alexandria Plan,” 17.
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198. Mills, “The Alexandria Plan,” 17.
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Mills Devises a Solution to Improve Emergency Services
As a result of staffing difficulties, increasing patient volumes, and mounting
criticism, administrators decided to improve emergency services at the hospital.
Emergency room committees conducted studies and experimented with several
options.199 The hospital first assigned attending physicians to mandatory ER duty, but
they were “unable to sustain the commitment.”200 Although specialty physicians were
willing to participate in emergency care as consultants, they were not willing to provide
comprehensive emergency care in the ER. Hospital administrators considered using GPs
on a rotating basis to staff the ER but were ultimately “reluctant” to impose such a
burden on these physicians who composed only a small percentage of the medical
staff.201 Hospital administrator Charles Goff considered staffing the ER with senior
medical students or licensed Public Health Service personnel, but they ultimately
decided these solutions were “legally or ethically suspect. It looked as though we might
have to close down the emergency room entirely.”202
On 26 June 1961 Dr. James D. Mills Jr., a local practitioner and the President of
the Medical Staff at Alexandria Hospital since 1960, came up with a new idea. According
to Pinson, “one night he went home, and it had just been hellacious, and just thought
that there had to be a better way, and he just started…writing out plans.”203 He recruited

199. Ibid.
200. Ferber, “Practice Limited to the Emergency Room,” 78.
201. Mills, “The Alexandria Plan,” 17.
202. Ferber, “Practice Limited to the Emergency Room,” 78.
203. Pinson, interview.
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three other general practitioners in the area, John P. McDade, William J. Weaver, and
Chalmers A. Loughridge, to join him as full-time emergency physicians. All four
physicians relinquished their practices and entered into a five-year independent contract
with Alexandria Hospital in order to provide twenty-four-hour coverage of the ER. The
physicians charged a fee for service based on Blue Shield and community fees, and the
hospital charged an additional fee for service.204 The minimum charge per patient was a
$5 physician fee and a $5 hospital fee.205 Private patients paid a fee for service, and a
municipal appropriate paid for the care of medically indigent patients.206 The doctors
worked twelve-hour shifts for five days, followed by five days off.207 One doctor was in
the ER and one doctor was on call at all times; part-time military physicians from Fort
Belvoir were hired part-time to moonlight in the ER as needed during peak loads.208

The Success of the Alexandria Plan
The Alexandria Plan, which represented an innovation in ER management, was
an extraordinary success. There were several factors which contributed to this success:
Mills’ careful choice of colleagues; the physicians' establishment of positive relationships
with local practitioners, hospital staff, and patients; the town’s financial support for
medically indigent patients; and the availability experienced military physicians to
provide additional staffing support. The lasting success of the plan can primarily be
attributed to the long-term, full-time commitment of the emergency physicians to the
204. Mills, “A Method of Staffing a Community Hospital Emergency Department,” 519.
205. Ferber, “Practice Limited to the Emergency Room,” 82.
206. Mills, “A Method of Staffing a Community Hospital Emergency Department,” 519.
207. Pinson, interview.
208. Mills, “The Alexandria Plan,” 21.
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Alexandra ER. Over the course of their careers, they improved the reputation of
emergency medicine within the hospital and the community and established new
standards for emergency care.
The first factor that led to the success of the Alexandria Plan was Mills’ careful
choice of emergency physicians. They were all close friends who had been general
practitioners in Alexandria for three to twelve years. They all agreed to relinquish their
practices in order to work full-time in the ER. This may have encouraged patients, left
without a private physician, to go to the ER where they would encounter a familiar face.
According to Pinson, “with being in private practice, all four…knew everybody…it
wasn’t like somebody was taking over that nobody knew.”209 Furthermore, the
physicians were well respected within the community and the hospital. Mills, as
President of the Medical Staff, was a prominent figure in the hospital. All four
physicians were willing to make a long-term commitment to emergency medicine. In
1961, even though the Alexandria Plan represented a new, radical approach to ER
management, these four physicians took the risk of establishing a five-year contract with
the hospital. They continued to work in the ER at Alexandria for the remainder of their
professional careers.210
The success of the plan also hinged on the support of patients, local practitioners,
and medical staff. The emergency physicians met with initial resistance from local
practitioners and hospital staff and worked hard to gain their support. According to
McDade, “when we started out, we had a lot of enemies. People were certain that we
were going to take over the medical practice in the hospital. We had a lot of people
209. Pinson, interview.
210. Zink, “Reflections on the Past 25 Years in Emergency Medicine: Learning From Our
History,” Journal of Emergency Medicine 35, no. 1 (July 2008): 2.
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suspicious of us. So suspicious. Mostly the surgeons that were involved with the
emergency department.”211 Some of the local practitioners were concerned that the
emergency physicians would compete for patients. The support of local practitioners
was critical for two reasons: (1) patients often relied on their physicians’ advice when
deciding to go to the ER and (2) these physicians could often provide valuable
information about their patients.
In order to win the support of local practitioners, Mills and his colleagues set
strict limitations on patient care in the ER in order to preserve the autonomy of local
physicians. The Alexandria Plan included a stipulation that patients with private
physicians “will be treated only at the request of the patient’s doctor” and that “no
continuing course of therapy will be undertaken.”212 The plan did not permit ER
physicians to engage in private practice. When patients were admitted to the ER, the
physicians made a special effort to contact local practitioners by phone in order to
include them in the decision-making process. The private physician could give orders
over the phone or in writing; alternatively, he could refer his patient to the ER physician
or another staff member for medical care.213 The emergency physicians adhered strictly
to these stipulations. All four physicians terminated their relationships with former
patients. According to Mills, “we follow the same routine in the emergency room with
our former patients as we do with strangers.”214 They kept private physicians informed
about their patients’ ER visits and referred all patients to their private physicians for
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follow-up care. Patients without a long-term provider were given the choice of three
physicians within the community based on geographical location.215
Mills and his colleagues also worked to establish positive relationships with the
hospital staff, especially the surgeons and nurses. In response to surgeons’ concerns that
some of their clientele would be treated in the ER, Mills and his colleagues agreed not to
perform surgery.216 Two local GPs performed minor surgeries such as appendectomies
in the ER while surgeons took the more serious cases.217 The physicians also established
positive working relationships with the nurses. According to Pinson, “It was
wonderful…you worked side by side with them, and they really trusted you…they
taught you a lot, they wanted you to be an extra hand for them, and it was such a small
group of nurses at that time, it was very family-oriented.”218
Another key component that led to success of the Alexandria Plan was the
town’s financial support for non-insured patients. A six-month trial period was required
in order for the Alexandria Plan to obtain approval by the medical staff, the board of
directors, and the city council.219 After the plan was approved, the City Council
provided a stipend to cover the costs of medical care for the uninsured.220 This mitigated
the financial burden of the emergency room. Although the ER was still not a financial
success for the hospital, which collected only 50 percent of fees, it was a financial success
for the physicians. Their income was higher than it had been in private practice. They
215. Mills, “The Alexandria Plan,” 18.
216. Zink, “Reflections on the Past 25 Years in Emergency Medicine,” 2.
217. Pinson, interview.
218. Ibid.
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220. Pinson, interview.

65
averaged a forty-two-hour to fifty-six-hour workweek, as compared to the sixty-hour
workweek in private practice.221 The improved hours and compensation provided
incentives to continue working in the ER rather than returning to private practice and
made their careers sustainable over the long-term.
The broad availability of military physicians provided a valuable resource for
Mills and his colleagues. In other regions of the country, it might have been more
difficult to find additional qualified physicians who were interested in working in the
ER on a part-time basis. As compared to other specialists or GPs, many of these
physicians had experienced the triage and trauma systems in the military and could
apply their medical knowledge directly to civilian medical care in the ER.
As a result of all of these factors, the Alexandria Plan was a great success. This
success was accompanied by expansion of the ER and the EMS system: the ER moved
from the basement to an entire wing on the first floor of the hospital and a third Fire
Department ambulance was put in operation “to further improve emergency service” in
1964.222 The Alexandria Plan was well received by local practitioners, hospital
administrators, and patients. A few months after its initiation, the majority of local
practitioners responded favorably to a questionnaire about emergency services. One
physician noted “the system is run ethically, with constant consideration for patients
and for other physicians.”223 According to another, “I never fail to receive a call when
one of my patients shows up at the emergency room…later, I can get a copy of the

221. Ferber, “Practice Limited to the Emergency Room,” 84.
222. Mills, “A Method of Staffing a Community Hospital Emergency Department,” 518; Annual
Report: City of Alexandria 1963-1964 (Alexandria, VA: Planning and Urban Renewal Department,
1964), Alexandria Library Local History/Special Collections, 8.
223. Ferber, “Practice Limited to the Emergency Room,” 84.

66
records and lab reports from the hospital. It’s a most helpful and workable
procedure.”224 According to Mills, the emergency physicians had established “cordial
relations” with the local physicians and had received the support of the hospital staff by
1964.225 Most importantly, patient satisfaction remained high and patients continued to
use the ER. The patient load doubled in the first year and increased 14 percent from 1962
to 1963.226 According to Mills, “the public is pleased with our service…whatever the
reasons, we know the complaints have decreased and that the hospital board and the
administrator are both satisfied and cooperative.”227
The four physicians’ lifelong commitment to the ER contributed to the long-term
success of the Alexandria Plan. At a time when physicians and residents were becoming
increasingly resistant to working in the ER, the Alexandria Plan provided the hospital
with a group of committed physicians who enjoyed working in the ER and were
invested in its development. Over the course of their careers, these physicians developed
trusting relationships with patients and local practitioners. According to Pinson, “a lot of
doctors came and saw their own patients…as [Mills’ and his colleagues’] reputation
grew, it was very seldom that they would come to see their own patients.”228 As local
practitioners started to trust the emergency physicians, they became less involved in
emergency room care. In later years Mills and his colleagues only made phone calls to
local practitioners “if there was a problem or if an admission had to happen.”229 The
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physicians’ long-term commitment also facilitated the development of consistent
standards for emergency room care. Pinson recalls when McDade first decided that
every patient’s vital signs needed to be recorded. This was such a novel and unheard of
idea in the sixties that she and the other nurses were surprised at first. According to
Pinson, “each year, each month…we got our first monitor…things improved.”230 By
establishing patient care guidelines and purchasing new equipment, these four
physicians established an ER infrastructure that would last longer than their careers.

The Alexandria Plan Spreads To Other Communities
The news of the success of the Alexandria Plan spread to other communities.
Many physicians visited Alexandria Hospital in order to learn about the new staffing
method and ultimately model it at their own hospitals.231 Local community competition
played a role in the spread of new staffing methods: nearby Fairfax Hospital hired fulltime emergency physicians after the Alexandria Plan had been implemented.232 Former
army officer Dr. Reinald Leidelmeyer became a part-time emergency physician there in
the same month that the Alexandria Plan started.233
The American Medical Association (AMA) increased national awareness of the
Alexandria Plan. Under the leadership of Richard Manegold, the AMA published a
booklet entitled Emergency Department: A Handbook for Medical Staff in 1966. It provided
physicians with the essential elements of the Alexandria Plan, included sample contracts
230. Ibid.
231. Zink, “Reflections on the Past 25 Years in Emergency Medicine,” 2.
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from full-time physician staffing plans, and emphasized the importance of the ER in
patient care. It stated, “It is undeniable that the emergency service is at least as
important as any other inpatient department in the hospital. For this reason, ‘emergency
department’ seems the most apropos and is used throughout this handbook. The
recognition of the emergency service as a ‘department’ of the hospital may be the first
step in solving its problems.”234 The AMA booklet, although it did not directly promote
the use of full-time emergency physicians over other staffing methods, did increase
national awareness of the new staffing method and help to create a broad base of
professional support for emergency physicians.235
As the Alexandria Plan spread beyond the local region, many physicians across
the country closed their practices and started working full-time in the ER. According to
Mills, “spontaneously, at local levels throughout the country, there developed new
concepts in the hospital delivery of emergency health care. These plans were put into
operation on local initiative to meet local conditions.”236 Like Alexandria, each
community had a particular set of local factors that motivated hospitals to change their
staff method. According to Dr. Robert H. Kennedy, “in each community some one or
more persons have tried to adapt the existing emergency department to the local needs. I
have surveyed many emergency facilities and have yet to come across two which are
alike.”237 The various staffing methods had one commonality: the use of part-time or
full-time salaried physicians to run the ER. Numerous case reports of staffing methods
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similar to the Alexandria Plan and of larger groups of contracting physicians
appeared.238 In 1964 Detroit’s Harbor Hospital adopted a variation of the Alexandria
Plan.239 At Binghamton General, a group of five physicians commenced full-time
practice in the ER in 1965.240
The staffing method continued to spread during the sixties. The ACS published
an article in 1969 that discussed full-time coverage of ERs by physicians who had no
other patients, office, or hospital privileges.241 An ER staffing study of twenty-two
hospitals demonstrated a trend toward “a greater degree of in-hospital physician
coverage…utilizing physicians paid by the hospital.”242 A study of 221 hospitals in
Illinois further supported these findings.243 By the 1970s there were an estimated 425 to
450 full-time groups in ER practice. At approximately five physicians per group, these
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figures indicate that there were approximately 2,200 emergency physicians in groups.244
These leadership changes revolutionized emergency medical care. According to
Mangold in 1974, “the full-time emergency physician has been one of the most
significant influences in revolutionizing emergency health services and the care of the
acutely ill and injured.”245 This new staffing method marked the beginning of a new
specialty: emergency medicine.

Limitations of the Alexandria Plan
Small community hospitals were the first to hire full-time emergency physicians.
By the 1970s many hospitals with 100 to 300 beds had adopted staffing methods similar
to the Alexandria Plan, while few larger hospitals had adopted it.246 There were several
reasons for this. First, smaller hospitals relied more heavily on the support of the
community. They were threatened by local competition of nearby hospitals and were
increasingly concerned about the threat of lawsuits.247 According to Kennedy,
“administrators…in an effort to avoid litigation involving the hospital…have jumped at
the opportunity to staff their ERs around the clock with licensed physicians.”248 With
growing concerns about litigation, community hospitals recognized the importance of
establishing positive relationships with the community. The ER played a critical role in
hospital-public relations because it saw a large volume of patients who arrived at a time
244. Robert H. Kennedy, “Lecture: Emergency Department Physicians: Their Capabilities,
Contributions, Education, and Future Status,” Journal of Trauma 14, no. 10 (October 1974): 897.
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of urgency. Consequently, patient complaints about emergency services had a
significant impact on hospital policy at the local level. The staffing method became
increasingly popular because it was successful in decreasing patient complaints at
Alexandria Hospital and other community hospitals throughout the country.249
It was also easier for emergency physicians to succeed in communities where
local practitioners supported the use of emergency services. At a time when physicians
were organizing into group practices and becoming increasingly unavailable, many
physicians referred their patients to the local ER for urgent problems. Physicians
organized into group practices in the same regions where emergency physicians
appeared: the regions with a large percentage of paying patients, primarily in the
Midwest.250 Furthermore, even in a particular region, private physicians referred
patients to community hospitals more often than they referred patients to large county
hospitals. A study conducted in Fresno supported this trend: 64 percent of ER patients at
four community hospitals were physician-referred, while only 5 percent of ER patients
at a large county hospital were physician-referred.251 Physician support for community
hospital ERs increased patient volumes and validated the belief that the ER was a
suitable place for patients to go for medical problems.
From a financial standpoint, it was easier for hospitals in middle-class
communities with insured patients to adopt these new staffing methods as compared to
249. Abbott, “Attending Doctors Staff Emergency Room,” 77-78; “30 M.D.’s Unite to Meet
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hospitals in poor urban areas. Alexandria, for example, had a large medically insured
population. The new staffing method was adopted in many community hospitals in the
Midwest, where the population was largely covered by health insurance.252 In
Alexandria, even with a large percentage of paying patients, the ER suffered a financial
loss. In spite of this, the hospital was able to provide adequate financial incentives for
the emergency physicians, who worked less and earned more than they had in private
practice. Mills devised his new staffing plan, in part, because he viewed it as a desirable
career. He came up with the idea after coming home “at 1 A.M. from a working day that
had started that morning at seven…I remember thinking that, as a chronically tired and
overworked G.P., I wasn’t being fair to myself, my family or my patients. It came to me
that in emergency service, with regular hours, I would be able to practice much better
medicine.”253 It would have been difficult for urban hospitals to offer competitive
salaries and hours to emergency physicians for two reasons: (1) these hospitals served a
large percentage of uninsured patients and (2) these hospitals would have required
more emergency physicians due to the higher incidence of high-severity patients,
increased trauma rates, and larger patient loads.

LONG JOURNEY AHEAD FOR NEW EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS
Although the Alexandria Plan was a success, emergency physicians had a long
way to go before attaining specialty status. They still encountered resistance from some
local practitioners who considered the ER an economic threat to their own practices,
especially for non-urgent problems. These physicians fought against the expansion of
252. Rosen, “History of Emergency Medicine,” 17; Robert H. Kennedy, “The Emergency
Department Situation” (lecture, meeting of the Committee on Trauma, April 22, 1966), 2.
253. Maisel, “Emergency Service: Medicine’s Newest Specialty,” 100.
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emergency services. According to Dr. James Leitzell, “some – particularly older general
practitioners – view ERs as economic threats. Medical staffs unite in demanding that ER
physicians neither steal patients nor usurp clinical turf.”254 In a 1963 edition of Virginia
Medical Monthly, an article entitled “Our Enemy: The Emergency Room” immediately
followed an article which celebrated the success of the Alexandria Plan. Its author was a
private-practice psychiatrist who occasionally served in the ER. He argued that the ER
should not provide care for non-urgent health problems. “Hospitals shouldn’t be
permitted, under the deception of maintaining an emergency room, to lie, cheat and
falsify the truth to compete with private practitioners.” He goes so far as to say that
physicians’ work in the ER is “contributing to our downfall” and declares, “it’s time we
wage effective warfare against our enemy: the emergency room.”255
Even the physicians who accepted the idea of full-time emergency medicine did
not consider emergency medicine a specialty. Many who earned the title of “emergency
physician” had minimal training and were hired directly out of internship.256 In Pontiac,
Michigan, physicians from all specialties filled full-time ER positions: general
practitioners, internists, surgeons, obstetricians, physical therapists, anesthesiologists,
and pediatricians.257 According to Rosen, this validated the belief “still prevalent, that
anyone can practice Emergency Medicine with time and experience.”258 Furthermore, all
specialist physicians had spent time in the ER during their training; this further
254. James D. Leitzell and Leonard M. Riggs “Sounding Boards, Emergency Medicine: Two
Points of View,” The New England Journal of Medicine 304, no. 8 (February 19, 1981): 478.
255. Roswell Porter, “Our Enemy: The Emergency Room,” Medical Economics, July 15, 1963, 71, 7475.
256. Rosen, “History of Emergency Medicine,” 17.
257. Abbott, “Attending Doctors Staff Emergency Room,” 78.
258. Rosen, “History of Emergency Medicine,” 17.
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validated the belief that any physician could practice emergency medicine. According to
Rosen, because physicians were largely unsupervised in the ER during residency, “they
had no awareness of how badly they practiced Emergency Medicine as house staff.” As
senior residents returning to the ER for a second time, they felt more comfortable with
their specialty and “were usually able to avoid patients who fell outside of that
specialty.” Many physicians believed that any specialist could practice emergency
medicine simply by learning about Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) and by
working in the ER on a regular basis.259
In spite of its limitations, the Alexandria Plan sparked the development of a new
specialty. Because the new emergency physicians were committed to the ER full-time,
they were able to develop a niche of clinical expertise and to standardize medical care in
the emergency room. They started to fulfill the specialty requirements by demonstrating
“special knowledge” in the field and by establishing a broad base of professional
support.260 There was one major condition that had not yet been satisfied: obtaining the
support of academic institutions and medical organizations. Although emergency
physicians had taken important steps to shape the field of emergency medicine, they
were still a long way from gaining formal specialty recognition.

259. Ibid., 18.
260. Paul Friedmann, “The Development of New Medical Specialties,” Current Surgery 60, vol. 1
(January-February 2003): 100-1.
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7
The Urban Teaching Hospital Resists Emergency Medicine as
a Specialty

Hartford Hospital and Yale-New Haven Hospital are urban teaching hospitals
that have had emergency services since the early 1900s. Yale-New Haven Hospital
became an academic institution after affiliating with Yale University School of Medicine
in 1965. These hospitals did not adopt staffing methods similar to the Alexandria Plan.
Instead, they redistributed the load of non-urgent visits by instituting triage systems and
expanding outpatient facilities. House staff ran the ER with minimal supervision.
Because urban teaching hospitals did not hire full-time emergency physicians in the
sixties, the development of emergency medicine as a specialty was delayed.

HARTFORD HOSPITAL
Hartford Hospital, an urban teaching hospital in Hartford, Connecticut,
attempted to reduce the patient load in the ER by implementing a triage system and
ambulatory services. Faced with a rising patient load and a house staff shortage, the
hospital hired medical staff to run the ER in the late sixties. The hospital started to hire
emergency physicians in the seventies. Hartford Hospital delayed ER staffing
modifications primarily as a result of financial limitations and the growing resistance of
medical staff to full-time emergency physicians.
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Early Years
In the early 1900s Hartford Hospital provided emergency care in an accident
room. The first approximation of annual visits to the accident room was fifteen hundred
in 1944.261 In 1956 an emergency room service was developed and an Emergency Room
Committee (ERC) was formed. The ERC met on a monthly basis in order to discuss ER
management and organization. The Department of Surgery was ultimately responsible
for the ER but patient responsibility was shared with Department of Medicine.262

The Emergency Room in the 1960s
In 1960 Hartford’s population of 162,000 was significantly larger than
Alexandria’s population.263 The hospital was larger than Alexandria Hospital: it had 800
beds and saw 27,000 patients in the ER per year.264 As in Alexandria, the EMS system
was relatively underdeveloped: it was run by family-owned businesses, and there was
no system of communication between the hospital and EMS personnel.265
The ER was divided into two sections, medical and surgical. The surgical side
mainly took trauma cases; the medical side took patients with abdominal and chest
symptoms. According to Dr. David Crombie, a general surgeon who practiced at
261. “Histories File” (Hartford, CT: Hartford Hospital Emergency Room), in Drawer 1, The
Hamilton Archives at Hartford Hospital, Hartford CT.
262. The Chairman of the Department of Surgery was also the Chairman of the Emergency Room
Committee.
263. Refer to Table 3 in Appendix 1.
264. Roswell K. Brown, “Hartford Hospital Emergency Department,” 26 May 1965, in Box 22,
folder labeled “ERC 1962-1966,” Blake Papers. Refer to Table 4 in Appendix 1.
265. H. David Crombie, MD, interview by author, New Haven, CT, October 30, 2008. Dr. Crombie
completed his internship and surgical residency at Hartford Hospital in the early 1960s and spent
two years in the US Navy from 1967 to 1969. He served as Director of Surgery at Hartford
Hospital from 1994 to 1997.
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Hartford Hospital from 1969 to 2004, the division of patients between the medical and
surgical sides of the emergency room was “only loosely adhered to.”266 The junior
resident saw patients and “made a presumptive diagnosis” based on a medical history,
physical examination, and other studies. He then called a resident from the appropriate
specialty service. Although the system was “frantic to some degree…it was also quite
methodical.” Crombie thought it worked well overall.267
Two surgical interns and a second-year medicine resident provided regular
coverage in the ER. A fourth-year surgical resident was ultimately responsible for
patient care. Interns were encouraged to seek help if necessary, starting with the
assistant surgical resident, followed by the senior surgical resident and the surgical
attending staff.268 According to a 1960 publication Standard Operation Procedure for the
Emergency Room, interns were required to contact the senior surgical resident for “poor
risk” or “critical” patients. The senior surgical resident was also required to see all nonsurgical patients who were “critical” or “questionably critical” or who stayed overnight
in the ER.269 The specific definitions of these terms were left to the best clinical judgment
of the house staff.

266. Ibid.
267. Ibid.
268. Memorandum, “Emergency Room Medical and Surgical Coverage,” Hartford Hospital
Emergency Room Committee, 1 July 1955, in Box 22, folder labeled “Emergency Room
Committee, minutes and correspondence, Nov. 18, 1955 – Sept. 21, 1962,” Marlene Blake Papers,
The Hamilton Archives at Hartford Hospital, Hartford, CT.
269. Philip R. Partington, Standard Operation Procedure for the Emergency Room, Hartford Hospital
Emergency Room Committee, 21 March 1960, in Box 22, folder labeled “Emergency Room
Committee, minutes and correspondence, Nov. 18, 1955 – Sept. 21, 1962,” Marlene Blake Papers,
The Hamilton Archives at Hartford Hospital, Hartford, CT (hereafter cited as Box 22, folder
labeled “ERC 1955-1962,” Blake Papers).
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As a surgical PGY-2, Crombie was in charge of the medical and surgical sides of
the ER.270 Unlike some of the other surgical residents, Crombie enjoyed working in the
ER and even offered to switch rotations with a fellow resident in order to spend extra
time there. Even those who enjoyed emergency care were often drawn to particular
cases that pertained to their specialty. Crombie, for example, viewed his ER time as an
opportunity to improve his clinical acumen with regard to abdominal pain. By seeing all
of the abdominal cases that passed through the ER, he had the opportunity to increase
his capabilities “in delineating the wheat from the chaff in serious abdominal
problems.”271
Junior attending physicians in several fields, such as general surgery,
gynecology, and internal medicine, covered the ER on a rotating basis. Specialist
physicians were available for consultations in internal medicine, pediatrics, surgery,
neurosurgery, orthopedics, and other medical and surgical divisions.272 According to a
1959 pamphlet entitled The Emergency Room Organization, medical and surgical attending
physicians were assigned to the emergency room on a rotating basis in order to provide
“direct supervision of the care rendered any and all patients by members of the House
Staff.”273 This direct supervision did not occur regularly; physicians came to the ER only
as needed by the house staff. As a resident, Crombie saw these physicians “a great
270. Prior to 1970, surgeons completed an internship year followed by a five-year residency
program. Effective 1 July 1975, internship became the first year of an integrated residency
program. Thus, a PGY-2 before 1970 would be the equivalent of a PGY-3 in today’s system.
271. Crombie, interview.
272. Minutes of the Emergency Room Committee, Hartford Hospital Emergency Room
Committee, 21 December 1956, in Box 22, folder labeled “ERC 1955-1962,” Blake Papers (hereafter
cited as Minutes, Hartford Hospital ERC).
273. The Emergency Room Organization, Hartford Hospital ERC, 1959, in Box 22, folder labeled
“Emergency Room Committee, minutes and correspondence, Nov. 18, 1955 – Sept. 21, 1962,”
Blake Papers.
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deal…they would come down both for ambulatory surgical issues, like lancing a boil,
evacuating a thrombosed hemorrhoid, putting in a few stitches…and they would also
come down for things that had the potential of being admitted for an operation or for
inpatient…care.” He recalls, “If something needed an urgent intervention, we’d just
holler to the next level up and get help down there, and you could always get help.”274
Although attending physicians did not provide full-time supervision, they were
accessible.

Patient Use of the Emergency Room Increases
Several factors contributed to increased patient volumes in the ER. First, as
family physicians became less available, Hartford’s emergency call system for doctors
was not unsuccessful. The Hartford County Medical Society abandoned it 1964 and
recommended that patients go to the ER of the nearest hospital if they needed
immediate medical attention.275 Consistent with the national trend, Hartford Hospital
advocated for a patient’s right to emergency medical care and accepted all patients who
entered the ER. Standard Operation Procedure for the Emergency Room stated, “No patient
requiring emergency treatment shall under any circumstances be transferred to another
hospital before receiving such treatment.”276

274. Crombie, interview.
275. Arthur C. Unsworth, Statistics and Matters for Consideration of Emergency Room Committee, 16
February 1966, in Box 22, folder labeled “Emergency Room Committee, minutes and
correspondence, Oct. 19, 1962-Sept. 1, 1966,” Blake Papers (hereafter cited as Box 22, folder
labeled “ERC 1962-1966”).
276. Philip R. Partington, Standard Operation Procedure for the Emergency Room.
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ER visits increased in spite of a population decrease. Hartford’s population
decreased by 11 percent from 1950 to 1970 as people migrated from cities to suburbs.277
In spite of this, emergency visits increased steadily from 3,000 to 18,000 in the years from
1944 to 1955. Emergency visits tripled in the decade up to 1963, when there were a total
of 36,000 visits.278 There was a substantial increase in non-urgent visits. According to
ERC Chairman Dr. Robert Barry approximately 48 percent of visits to the ER were not
“true” emergencies, and half of these could have been diverted elsewhere by
appropriate triage.279 A surgical house staff shortage in July 1962 exacerbated the
problem of patient overload.

Hospital Pressured to Improve Emergency Services
In 1961 physicians discussed the lack of supervision in the ER at several ERC
meetings. They remarked on the growing number of medical cases in the ER, which
posed a particular problem because there was not adequate medical coverage there.
Many staffing methods were proposed. Some physicians argued that the house staff
should continue to run the ER; others recommended that physicians staff the ER; still
others argued for creating a separate ER staffed on a full-time basis by younger
attending physicians from the surgical and medical departments.280 There was a debate
as to whether the ER should operate as a separate department or as a section of the

277. Refer to Figure 5 and Table 3 in Appendix 1.
278. Shortliffe, Hamilton, and Noroian, “The Emergency Room and the Changing Pattern of
Medical Care,” 21. Refer to Figure 6 and Figure 9 in Appendix 1.
279. Roswell K. Brown, “Hartford Hospital Emergency Department,” 26 May 1965, in Box 22,
folder labeled “ERC 1962-1966,” Blake Papers.
280. Minutes, Hartford Hospital ERC, 15 December 1961, in Box 22, folder labeled “ERC 19551962,” Blake Papers.
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outpatient department. In 1962 the ERC was focused on the transition into a new,
expanded facility. To complicate matters, the ER was operating at a deficit of
approximately $75,000 a year. Although the ERC discussed at length possible solutions
to patient overload, they did not implement any significant changes. They did add an
additional intern for night coverage, for a total of three interns, despite concerns that the
use of interns to run the ER might “endanger…the hospital accreditation.”281
The ERC had still not resolved the problem of inadequate staffing by 1964. At a
1965 meeting it was brought to the committee’s attention that sixty patients had left the
ER in October without having been seen by a doctor. The medical staff expressed
growing concerns among medical staff that patient care was being compromised.
Patients sent letters to Hartford Hospital complaining about the inadequate care and the
long wait times in the ER.282 In an annual report published in September 1966, the
inadequacy of patient care in the ER was brought to the attention of the entire hospital.
“This minor representation of the Staff in responsibility, administration, and
participation has resulted in unsatisfactory handling of the Emergency Room patient,
from the view point of the patient and the Staff and the Administration, and has resulted
in repeated investigations and reports regarding the Emergency Room.”283
In 1965 Dr. Roswell Brown, the Associate Director of the Field Program of the
Committee on Trauma of the ACS, evaluated the ER favorably in spite of staffing

281. Minutes, Hartford Hospital ERC, 20 July 1962, in Box 22, folder labeled “ERC 1955-1962,”
Blake Papers.
282. Minutes, Hartford Hospital ERC, 17 December 1965, in Box 22, folder labeled “ERC 19621966,” Blake Papers.
283. Arthur C. Unsworth, Annual Report of the Emergency Room Committee, Hartford Hospital ERC,
1 September 1 1966, in Box 41, folder labeled “Emergency Room Committee Annual Reports,
1958-1966,” Blake Papers (hereafter cited as Box 41, folder labeled “ERC Reports 1958-1966”).
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problems and patient complaints.284 According to Brown, “This is by far the best
emergency department that I have seen.”285 By this time the Committee on Trauma of
the ACS had surveyed several hundred hospital emergency departments.286 Despite
patient dissatisfaction and the lack of attending supervision, Hartford Hospital’s ER was
better than many of the emergency departments across the country. This was primarily
due to (1) the strength of its specialty services and their frequent participation in
emergency consultations and (2) the support from interns and residents, who worked at
only 20 percent of hospitals in the United States.287

Hartford Hospital Seeks to Improve Emergency Services
In 1966 several changes in ER management occurred. Hartford Hospital removed
the ER from the Department of Surgery and formed a new ERC with more authority “to
promote policies and practices in operation of this facility to insure the most efficient
operation obtainable.”288 Dr. Arthur C. Unsworth, chairman of the ophthalmology
department from 1946 to 1970, was appointed chairman of the new ERC. As the new
chairman Unsworth visited several nearby hospitals in order to examine their ER
staffing methods. His findings indicated that the Alexandria Plan had spread to small

284. Roswell K. Brown, “Hartford Hospital Emergency Department,” 26 May 1965, in Box 22,
folder labeled “ERC 1962-1966,” Blake Papers.
285. Ibid.
286. Skudder, McCarroll, and Wade, “Hospital Emergency Facilities and Services,” 44-50.
287. Maisel, “Emergency Service: Medicine’s Newest Specialty,” 100.
288. The committee included the Directors of the Departments of Anesthesiology, Medicine,
Neurosurgery, Obstetrics-Gynecology, Ophthalmology, Orthopedics, Otolaryngology, Pathology,
Pediatrics, Psychiatry, Radiology, Surgery and Urology. See Arthur C. Unsworth, Annual Report
of the Emergency Room Committee, Hartford Hospital Emergency Room Committee, 1 September
1966, in Box 41, folder labeled “ERC Reports 1958-1966,” Blake Papers.

83
community hospitals but not to urban teaching hospitals. At Grace-New Haven
Hospital, Dr. E. Richard Weinerman had instituted a triage system; all of the house
officers in the ER were above the intern level but there was no attending supervision.289
Two small towns in Connecticut adopted staffing methods similar to the
Alexandria Plan. Norwalk Hospital in Norwalk, Connecticut, had recently employed
five doctors on a fixed salary basis to run the ER. Danbury Hospital, a 220-bed hospital
in Danbury, Connecticut, hired three full-time physicians who had relinquished their
practices in order to manage the ER in 1966. The three original physicians, like those in
Alexandria, had been in practice for twenty years. Like the Alexandria physicians, they
were not able to admit patients or to continue in private practice. The doctors worked
forty-four hours a week, with two doctors on during the day and one at night. House
staff worked in the ER on a moonlighting basis.290 Both Norwalk and Danbury hospitals
adopted variations of the Alexandria Plan around the time when the AMA published
Emergency Department: A Handbook for Medical Staff by the AMA.
After Unsworth presented his findings, the ERC initiated administrative and
structural changes. The ER was combined with the Outpatient Department to form the
Department of Ambulatory Services. A new Director of Ambulatory Services ran the
department with his two assistant directors: one for surgical services (primarily the ER)
and one for the medical services (primarily the outpatient facilities).291 Seven physicians
from the staff worked on an hourly basis to facilitate this transition. Dr. Philip Cornwell,
Chairman of the Medical Advisory Board at Hartford Hospital, believed that the
289. Arthur C. Unsworth, Report on Visits to Emergency Rooms in Other Hospitals, 15 April 1966, in
Box 22, folder labeled “ERC 1962-1966,” Blake Papers.
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integration of the ER and outpatient facilities was important because patients were
increasingly using the ER for medical and non-urgent visits. The goal was to provide
“administrative coordination” of these facilities in order to streamline efficiency in
patient care.292 The ambulatory services were also critical component of the solution to
patient overload. With the opening of new ambulatory services in 1969 under the
direction of Dr. Howard Wetstone, the hospital administrators hoped patients would
use this facility rather than the ER for primary medical care.
Based on the model at Yale-New Haven Hospital, the ERC hired a triage officer
to see patients and determine disposition in 1966. A committee vote favored the triage
officer be an attending physician rather than a house officer.293 There were several
reasons for this, but the need for direct supervision of house staff was not one of them.294
In spite of this, a surgical resident was appointed as the triage officer and as acting
director of the ER. Former ERC chairman Dr. Robert Barry indicated that there were still
only three house officers, two interns and a third year resident on duty to handle an
average of 130 patients a day.295 The primary goal of triage was to refer patients to
ambulatory care facilities for non-urgent visits and thus to decrease the patient load in
the ER.
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By establishing a triage system, expanding the power of the ERC, and providing
additional intern coverage, Hartford Hospital attempted to improve the quality and
efficiency of emergency services. In spite of these efforts, ER visits continued to increase
at a relatively constant rate through 1973.296 Although the ER was considered on of the
best in the country, it lacked clearly documented standards for patient care. The two
formal publications of the ERC, The Emergency Room Organization and Standard Operation
Procedure for the Emergency Room, established vague standards at best and left most of the
important decisions up to the clinical judgment of inexperienced and overwhelmed
house staff. The large amount of patients who left the ER without being seen by a
physician clearly indicates these standards were not well enforced or simply were not
realistic given the daily patient load.

Emergency Medicine: On the Brink of Acceptance at Hartford Hospital
In 1968 residents’ resistance to work in the ER exacerbated the severe house staff
shortage. According to Crombie, residents in the other services, including surgery,
orthopedics, pediatrics, internal medicine, and obstetrics and gynecology, did not have
sufficient manpower to provide adequate ER coverage.297 Dr. Painter, an attending
physician at Hartford Hospital and a member of the ERC, felt that “the ER problem has
reached the point where we can no longer depend on the surgical interns and residents
or the medical interns and residents to take the entire load. It had reached the point
where each service has got to take care of its own problems, and if it can’t be done with

296. Refer to Figure 6 in Appendix 1.
297. Crombie, interview.
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available house staff, then it must be done with the attending staff.”298 The medical staff
developed a roster so that members contributed their services to cover the ER for
seventy-two hours a week. For the first time, the medical staff assumed direct care of
patients in the ER.
Attending physicians became increasingly visible in the ER in the seventies. An
Emergency Room Corporation was formed in 1970 in order to hire qualified physicians
to run the ER. In the seventies Crombie worked as a general surgeon in Hartford and as
a part-time ER physician According to Crombie, attending physicians started to
participate more frequently in patient care in the seventies. They performed surgical
repairs of lacerations and primarily cared for private-paying patients.
I would go to the emergency room and sit there, and when patients came in that
were paying patients, I would…introduce myself and say, ‘Hartford Hospital has
asked me to be here to cover the emergency room.’ This was different than the
old days, where…my predecessors were called by the house staff…you could see
that as a shift, or the ratcheting up of the competency of the individuals doing
the emergency care.299
Hartford Hospital started hiring emergency physicians in the seventies in order to
provide supervision of house staff in the ER.300 In spite of this, according to Wetstone,
“one must note that the general feeling of the Medical Staff has, to date, been against
full-time Emergency Room physicians.”301 This was primarily due to the inefficiency of
emergency physicians who intercepted patient care and often delayed patient
evaluation; it was also due to the transient nature of the emergency physician. Surgeons
298. Minutes, Hartford Hospital ERC, 14 February 1966, in Box 22, folder labeled “ERC 19621966,” Blake Papers.
299. Crombie, interview.
300. Ibid.
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became frustrated with emergency physicians because they often took longer than the
surgeons to diagnose surgical conditions. This ultimately caused delays and
inconveniences for the surgeons. This frustrated Crombie and his surgical colleagues on
several occasions.
The emergency medicine doctors were not going to serve as simply a gateway to
a specialist, without putting their intellect and challenging themselves to figure
out what was wrong. We all objected to that…if I got a call at 6:15P.M. from an
emergency doctor in the emergency room, saying that he had a patient down
there with appendicitis, and I learned that the patient came in at 1:15PM, this
was now five hours earlier that the patient had been evaluated, and now I was
going to call my kids and my wife and say instead of taking out an appendix at
2:30 or 3:00P.M. I’m going to be here until 9 doing this…I was infuriated. But the
way the emergency room doctors felt was, if you just want someone to…triage,
then you can do that with any kind of mid-level practitioner…so that was a
source of conflict between the specialists and the emergency medicine doctor.
And that difficulty hasn’t gone away.302
Many surgeons would have preferred to use their own house staff in order to
“accomplish all of those studies under our own egress and then pick the timing of when
an operation would be right and so on.303
The transient nature of the emergency physician made it difficult for local
physicians to establish long-term, trusting relationships with them. According to
Crombie, “There would be situations where…those of us in practice would get
accustomed to a particular emergency room doc and we would have a nice rapport on
the telephone and so on…and that individual would understand where we’re coming
from – and then that individual would move on.”304 The transient nature of the
emergency physician resulted in severed relationships with local practitioners. Unlike
Alexandria Hospital, Hartford Hospital did not have a core group of emergency
302. Ibid.
303. Ibid.
304. Crombie, interview.
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physicians who worked to develop long-term relationships in the community. It was
even more difficult for emergency physicians to establish relationships because the
hospital and the patient population in Hartford were significantly larger than in
Alexandria. Although local surgeons were frustrated with emergency physicians, they
were not as concerned about patient stealing as the surgeons had been in Alexandria.
The emergency doctors at Hartford Hospital did not perform surgery. Their greatest
frustrations were a result of delays in communication and the transient nature of the
emergency physician.
The resistance among the medical faculty to the idea of emergency physicians
was common at academic hospitals across the country. Mills recognized that this
resistance would be an obstacle to gaining specialty recognition. “Although we were
well respected in our own backyards, we became painfully aware of the pigeons on our
status among the organizations of medicine…Very senior surgeons debated us on basic
considerations: ‘Doesn’t the emergency department just do triage? Aren’t you just
talking about emergency department directors? You don’t mean you’d work 11PM to
7AM? You don’t mean a full-time job, do you?’ And so on.”305
The staffing changes at Hartford Hospital contributed to the development of
emergency medicine as a specialty. Attending staff started supervising the ER in the late
sixties, and emergency physicians started working in the ER in the early seventies. The
idea of using attending physicians to staff the ER was important: it marked the
beginning of support for emergency medicine in an academic setting. In spite of this
progress, medical faculty and local physicians still demonstrated strong resistance to

305. Mills, “Emergency Medicine, 1947-1987,” 85.
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emergency physicians. Emergency physicians still had a long way to go before gaining
acceptance at academic institutions.

YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL
Yale-New Haven Hospital, an urban academic institution in New Haven,
Connecticut, used similar approaches to those at Hartford Hospital to improve
emergency services: it established a triage system and ambulatory care facilities. As a
result, annual ER visits stabilized until 1967 when they started to increase more
dramatically.306 Unlike Hartford Hospital, Yale-New Haven Hospital did not hire
emergency physicians in the early seventies. Instead, they relied on senior house staff to
run the ER. Although this model did not persist, it was adequate for teaching hospitals
in the sixties.307 Academic institutions across the country used variations of this model
and relied on the strength of their house staff and consultation services to deliver high
quality care the ER.

Early Years
The earliest information about the accident room at New Haven Hospital dates
back to 1923 when 1,016 patients received treatment. In the thirties New Haven Hospital
had 24-hour emergency services run by a reserve staff of fifty-five physicians who
resided in the hospital on call. A hospital pamphlet discussed the importance of
emergency services in an urban environment. It stated, “No one is immune from
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accident, particularly in a city, where hazards are multiplied by congestion of
population and the complexity of machinery necessary for transportation and for the
maintenance of factories, shops, and homes. Nor can constant vigilance eliminate,
though it may lessen, the possibility in any large city of epidemics, fires, and other
catastrophes in which many lives are endangered.”308 It emphasized the importance of
an “alert, efficient emergency service with modern equipment for treatment and
diagnosis.”309

The Emergency Room in the 1960s
Yale-New Haven Hospital had 717 beds and ran the largest outpatient and
emergency services in Connecticut. On 22 March 1965, the hospital established a new
affiliation with Yale University School of Medicine and changed its name to Yale-New
Haven Hospital (YNHH). It cared for approximately 15 percent of welfare patients
hospitalized in the state and provided 75 percent of emergency and outpatient care for
the greater New Haven region.310 The ER was located on the ground floor of the hospital
and had full-time medical, nursing, clerical, and maintenance staff.311 There were three
emergency rooms: medical, surgical, and pediatric.
Unlike Hartford Hospital, ER residents were above the intern level. Three
assistant residents were on duty from surgery, medicine, and pediatrics.312 Other
308. Emergency Service: Number ten in a series of leaflets about the New Haven Hospital, New Haven
Hospital, 1932, Yale-New Haven Hospital Archives, New Haven, CT (hereafter cited as YNHH
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physicians were available as needed: on-call residents from specialty services,
supervising senior staff members, and a panel of community and faculty physicians who
provided follow-up care for private patients.313 Based on a nurse’s initial triage, patients
were evaluated by the admitting house officer in medicine, surgery, or pediatrics.314 As
with Hartford Hospital, chief residents and attending physicians came down to the ER
as needed.
According to Dr. Louis G. Weld, Chairman of the Department of Medicine, it was
beneficial to use senior house staff in the ER because they had more clinical experience
than junior house staff and were better able to recognize the truly sick patients who
might need to be admitted.315 Dr. Richard Weinerman, the Director of Ambulatory
Services at Yale-New Haven Hospital from 1962 to 1968, argues that interns are not
qualified to provide ER coverage.
Interns and nurses just finishing their training had no essential role in the
emergency service without direct and considerable supervision. This I think was
of some surprise to many, but there was a strong feeling that emergency services
are too complex, too fast moving, too difficult for the very young trainees
without very careful supervision. The backing of the intern by the resident staff
must be immediate and scheduled. The ultimate responsibility never leaves the
hospital medical staff for supervision, direction and standards. A formalized and
immediately available on-call system to back up the resident and interns is
necessary.316
The idea that interns were not qualified to provide emergency care was a “surprise” to
medical faculty who believed that emergency care was straightforward enough to be

313. Weinerman, “Changing Patterns in Medical Care,” 5.
314. Jules V. Coleman and Paul Errera, “The General Hospital Emergency Room and Its
Psychiatric Problems,” American Journal of Public Health 53, no. 8 (August 1963): 1296.
315. Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report 1972, Office of Information and Development,
February 1973, YNHH Archives, 7.
316. Hospital Emergency Services, 63.
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handled by residents at the beginning of their training. This belief predominated at
many academic institutions in the sixties.
Dr. Richard Stahl, who completed his surgical residency at Yale in the late
seventies, mentioned one of the critical elements of success in the ER: collaboration with
nurses and fellow house staff. He says, “you would be…desperate together…consulting
on each other” and there was a strong “atmosphere of camaraderie…you had to count
on each other.”317 Although patient care in the ER could be challenging and
overwhelming, residents succeeded because they had support of other residents, nurses,
attending physicians, and specialty services.
Many residents had also benefited from experiences in military medicine that
prepared them well for emergent patient care. Because the physician draft lasted until
1972, many senior house staff members served in the military during residency. Dr.
Richard Lee, an internist who was responsible for the medical outpatient department,
clinics, and ER in the early seventies, noted that the clinical knowledge residents gained
during military service helped them diagnose and treat emergency patients. He says, “a
lot of the senior residents between first and second years had been in the [military]
service, so the senior house staff were older and…had a lot more experience under their
belt.”318

317. Richard Stahl, MD, interview by author, New Haven, CT, November 11, 2008. Dr. Stahl, a
plastic surgeon, completed his general surgery residency at Yale-New Haven Hospital in the late
seventies and returned as an assistant professor at the Yale University School of Medicine in
1983. He served as assistant medical director of the ER in surgery for nine years and currently
serves as associate chief of surgery at Yale-New Haven Hospital.
318. Richard Lee, MD, telephone interview by author, November 12, 2008. Dr. Lee completed his
residency in internal medicine in the mid-sixties at Yale-New Haven Hospital and currently
practices in Buffalo, New York.
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Patient Use of the Emergency Department Increases
Patient use of the emergency department increased at Yale-New Haven Hospital
as a result of the changing nature of the physician-patient relationship and population
shifts. The higher patient loads on weekends, consistent with national trends, indicated
patients used emergency services for non-urgent conditions when private physicians
were unavailable.319 Approximately one-third of patients arrived on Saturday and
Sunday. The distributions were highest in the summer months when physicians tended
to take vacation and were lowest in the winter months.320 There was an increasing trend
from night to morning ER visits from 1959 to 1964. These data may indicate an increase
in elective visits for non-urgent problems.321 Weinerman also found that the majority of
patient visits (56 percent) were non-urgent, while only 6 percent of visits were emergent
and 36 percent were urgent.322
Population mobility also led to increased patient visits. In a 1964 study
Weinerman found that 47 percent of ER patients had been at their current address for
less than two years and that the proportion of non-urgent cases declined as the years of

319. Skudder, McCarroll, and Wade, “Hospital Emergency Facilities and Services,” 44-50.
320. Refer to Figure 8 in Appendix 1. As a result of improved transportation by the Connecticut
Turnpike, population increases were expected around Milford and the Guilford-Madison area in
the sixties, but this had a minimal impact on patient load because 90 percent of ER patients were
from New Haven. See Greater New Haven Regional Hospital Council, 28 November 1962, in Box 1,
Series 1, Folder 10 labeled “New Haven Area Hospital Planning,” Snoke Papers, 2; Weinerman,
“Changing Patterns in Medical Care,” 8.
321. Weinerman, “Changing Patterns in Medical Care,” 7.
322. S.K. Kwass, “Social Class Difference in Emergency Room Attendance,” (bachelor’s thesis,
Yale University, 1958); MD Lebowitz et al., “Socioeconomic Analysis of the Alameda County
Health Department Jurisdiction,” American Journal of Public Health 54, no. 11 (1964): 1876.
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residential tenure increased.323 This indicates that people typically used the ER after
relocating. Population migration also contributed to increased ER visits. The population
in New Haven decreased in the sixties.324 Because many physicians migrated to the
suburbs, the urban poor were left without physicians.325 According to Weinerman,
urban populations consisted primarily of “economically dependent, socially isolated,
minority population groups – often recent arrivals in the old communities, with remote
connections to the ‘usual’ pattern of private medical care.”326 In New Haven, 85 to 90
percent of ER patients were in the lowest socioeconomic groups.327 The population using
the ER was primarily composed of young, male, non-married, central urban, and
relatively poor individuals.328
As a result of population shifts and the changing nature of the physician-patient
relationship, Yale-New Haven Hospital experienced dramatic increases in ER visits.
From 1953 to 1963, hospital visits increased by 27 percent and clinic visits increased by
29 percent – but ER visits increased by 76 percent.329 The number of ER visits doubled
from forty thousand to eighty thousand in the 1960s.330
323. E. Richard Weinerman et al., “Yale Studies in Ambulatory Medical Care: V. Determinants of
Use of Hospital Emergency Services,” American Journal of Public Health 56, no. 7 (July 1966): 1043,
1047.
324. Refer to Figure 7 and Table 3 in Appendix 1.
325. Jules V. Coleman, “Psychiatric Studies of Patient Needs in Emergency Services of General
Hospitals.” Medical Care 5, no. 4 (July-August 1967): 255.
326. Weinerman, “Changing Patterns in Medical Care,” 3.
327. Coleman, “Patient Needs in Emergency Services,” 255.
328. E. Richard Weinerman and Herbert R. Edwards, “Yale Studies in Ambulatory Medical Care:
‘Triage’ System Shows Promise in Management of Emergency Department Load,” Hospitals 38,
(November 16, 1964): 55-62.
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Based on Weinerman’s studies, the poor population did not use the ER more
frequently for non-urgent conditions than the non-poor. Even in the highest of income
groups (above $10,000 per year), 59 percent of patients were non-urgent.331 This was
likely due to increasing reluctance of patients to contact their regular physicians for
health problems. Only 41 percent of patients who claimed to have a regular physician
sought his help initially.332 In 1962 one-third of patients claimed to use the emergency
service for all medical care needs, one-third were entirely self-referred, 7 percent were
referred by the hospital, and 20 percent arrived under “classical emergency auspices.”
Unlike Alexandria, where many local practitioners referred their patients to the
community ER, only one-tenth of YNHH ER patients were physician-referred.333

Advancements in Pre-Hospital and Coronary Care
Yale-New Haven Hospital lagged behind other institutions in pre-hospital care.
The Connecticut Ambulance Association and Yale-New Haven Hospital jointly
sponsored a twelve-week ambulance driver course in 1967. A citywide disaster drill was
completed in 1968 in order to test the coordinated efforts of police, fire, civilian defense,
and the emergency facilities of Yale-New Haven Hospital, the Hospital of St. Raphael,
and the Veterans Administration Hospital in West Haven. Yale-New Haven Hospital

331. Weinerman et al., “Yale Studies in Ambulatory Medical Care: V. Determinants of Use of
Hospital Emergency Services,” 1047.
332. Ibid., 1045.
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joined twenty other Connecticut hospitals in direct line radio network for
communicating disaster and administrative information in 1968.334
There were developments in coronary care. The Coronary Care Unit was
established in 1966. Up to 1 October 1967, there were 189 admissions to the unit, with 49
deaths, representing an overall mortality rate of 25.9 percent. The mortality rate for these
patients in acute general hospitals without coronary care units was higher,
approximately 30 percent.335

Growing Concerns About the Non-Urgent Patients
The information disbursed within the hospital about the ER was laudatory. An
annual report in 1967 highlighted the excellence of Yale New Haven Hospital’s
emergency medical care.
The quality of emergency treatment was dramatically illustrated one foggy,
tragic night last December when three Yale students were admitted, all near
death from multiple injuries received when their car collided with a truck.
Despite the fact that the emergency suite was already crowded with victims of an
earlier accident and with other patients seeking attention, two surgical teams
were assembled within a very short time to perform delicate neurosurgical
operations on the students. Unfortunately, one young man was too badly injured
to be saved, but the other two survived – and only because this Hospital had the
facilities and the personnel trained to cope with the situation. The student who
did not survive has made a place in history as the donor of the first kidney
transplant to take place in Connecticut.336
This event was handled well because the surgical residents recognized the critical nature
of the situation and adequately prepared for the accident victims. Although this was
334. “Highlights of the Year from October 1, 1967,” in Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report 1968
(New Haven, CT: Whitney Curtis Inc, 1967), YNHH Archives, 17.
335. Courtney C. Bishop, “Report of the Chief of Staff,” in Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report
1967 (New Haven, CT: Whitney Curtis Inc, 1967), YNHH Archives, 12.
336. Charles H. Costello, “Report of the President,” in Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report 1967
(New Haven, CT: Whitney Curtis Inc, 1967), YNHH Archives.
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clearly not a direct result of excellent emergency services, it reflected the prowess of the
surgical teams who administered patient care.
In spite of this success story, the medical staff recognized the problem of
increasing use of the ER for non-urgent medical visits. Dr. Sherwin B. Nuland, a surgeon
at Yale-New Haven Hospital, drew a distinction between the emergency patient, who
was treated well in the ER, and the non-urgent emergency room patient, who was not
adequately cared for in the ER.
The kind of skill we can bring to the emergency patient in this institution is an
extraordinary phenomenon. Anyone who has been present when five or six
badly injured persons are brought in from an automobile accident, has seen
highly skilled house officers seemingly come out of the walls and begin to help
those patients, will never go away saying that the emergency patient in the
hospital is not well taken care of. It’s the emergency room patient that worries me
because he’s often the fellow who shouldn’t really be there in the first place. How
this problem will ever be solved, I don’t know. Obviously many people are
working on it. But there has to be some way to differentiate between the
emergency patient and the emergency room patient. I’d like to be able to agree
with Dr. Bishop that we give a consistently high level of care to all of the people
coming in, but I don’t think we do.337
Dr. Nuland attributed this, in part, to the residents’ enthusiasm in treating the
emergency patient, as opposed to the emergency room patient.
One reason is that our house staff in that service is attuned to the emergency
patient. In the course of their training, this is the only sustained contact they’re
likely to have with true emergencies. It’s exciting. They’re young. There are all
kinds of other psychological reasons for their being oriented in this manner. And
they really go into action for the emergency patient. On the other hand, when
they’re faced with a patient who has come to the emergency room for attention
because he doesn’t have any other place to go, the house officers on duty are
much less interested. They’re not as concerned with the psycho-social problems
of chronic illness at that time of their life, although they may become so later on
in their careers. But as things stand now, we have to face the fact that the
emergency patient will get absolutely supreme care in this institution, and the
emergency room patient will not.338
337. Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report 1970, Office of Information and Development,
February 1971, YNHH Archives, 7.
338. Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report 1970, Office of Information and Development,
February 1971, YNHH Archives, 7.
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This distinction was an important one, and it may have been one of the major factors
that permitted Yale-New Haven Hospital to continue to run its ER with a focus on the
urgent rather than the non-urgent patient. In most cases, the house staff was effective in
differentiating urgent from non-urgent patients and seeking assistance for those who
needed immediate care.

Financial Troubles Limit Capacity for Change
The financial problems of the ER were mentioned in several of Yale-New Haven
Hospital’s records in the early 1960s. In 1959 emergency room operating deficits totaled
$107,000.339 A 1961 report indicated the city had not paid the hospital for emergency or
outpatient services since March 1958.340 The costs in excess of collections for care of
‘medically indigent’ patients included $291,000 for admitted patients, $431,000 for
outpatient clinics, and $878,000 for the emergency room in 1962.341
The expenses of the Hospital of St. Raphael and the Yale-New Haven Hospital
exceeded their income by $7.4 million from 1957 to 1967. The net losses in the outpatient
and emergency departments for the two hospitals combined increased from $814,000 to
$1.3 million from 1962 to 1966. Due to financial losses, the hospital was forced to use its
supplemental income from endowments and divert $6.1 million from depreciation

339. Ibid., 3.
340. The Financial Problems of the Hospital, 23 February 1961, in Box 1, Series 1, Folder 4 labeled
“Hospital Financing, Cost, and Reimbursement ,” Snoke Papers, 5.
341. Albert W. Snoke, A Report to the Community on the Hospital Care of the Indigent, Grace-New
Haven Hospital, 25 September 1963, in Box 1, Series 1, Folder 4 labeled “Hospital Financing, Cost,
and Reimbursement ,” Snoke Papers, 2.
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reserves in order to finance operating deficits alone.342 The uninsured population in
outpatient clinics and the ER were cited as the “major cause of the hospital’s deficits.”343
Because the ER was a financial drain, the hospital had no incentive to finance
improvements in emergency facilities, equipment, or patient care. The Connecticut
Medicaid program that began in 1966 helped ease the financial burden on the hospital,
but the program maintained a low-income limit of $3800 for a family of four; 90,500
families in the state were eligible for the program.344 Medicaid did not cover a large
portion of young workers who exceeded the income limit. Consequently, the emergency
room continued to operate at a financial loss.

Dr. Snoke Seeks to Improve Emergency Services
Dr. Albert Snoke, the CEO of the hospital from 1946 to 1967, recognized the need
for improvements in emergency care. He realized that the emergency service was “just
as bad and traditional in the 1960’s as…in the 1930’s when I was a medical student. I
became more and more aware of the deficiencies in patient care, organization, and in
finances.”345 Snoke made several attempts to fix the problem. He hired a full-time
surgeon to run the ER in the early sixties, but the surgeon “wasn’t satisfied with
administering and missed surgery.”346 Snoke then hired retired physician Dr. Herbert
342. Ibid., 3.
343. Albert W. Snoke, A Report to the Community on the Hospital Care of the Indigent and the
Medically Indigent, Yale-New Haven Hospital, 20 April 1967, in Box 1, Series 1, Folder 4 labeled
“Hospital Financing, Cost, and Reimbursement ,” Snoke Papers, 4.
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Edwards and nurse Carolina Falls to run the ER.347 This was “quite successful” because
Edwards and Falls communicated well with patients and explained reasons for delays in
their care.348 This ultimately led to increased patient satisfaction.
Snoke finally decided to create a new position: Director of Ambulatory Services.
He hired Dr. E. Richard Weinerman to fill this position on 1 July 1962. Weinerman had
joint responsibilities to the medical school and hospital and provided a single
administrative head for the hospital’s outpatient and emergency services, the medical
school’s private ambulatory services, and the medical school’s office of professional
services.349 Snoke appointed local pediatrician Dr. Jerome S. Beloff as director of the
emergency services on 1 March 1965, replacing Edwards.350 Beloff served as the director
of the ER, personnel health, and the outpatient department, which consisted of sixty-six
clinics. At this time, the Emergency Room Committee advised on ER policy. It included
the chiefs of surgical, medical, pediatric, and psychiatric clinics; ambulatory nursing
services; and personnel health service, in addition to the assistant administrator of
hospital and a representative of private surgeons.351
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A New Solution: The Medical Triage System and Ambulatory Care Facilities
Weinerman considered several approaches to stabilize the patient load and
improve efficiency of emergency care: expanding the emergency facilities; restricting
emergency care to those with acute injuries; developing alternative resources in the
community, such as medical society on-call panels, industrial medical centers, and
special treatment clinics; and instituting medical triage that would “define and limit the
role of the emergency station…protect the system of prompt service to those with urgent
need…avoid the development of a large, undifferentiated, one-quick-visit-only
dispensary for those seeking regular medical care…assist all patients in obtaining the
kind of service appropriate to their particular needs and…make optimum use of all
resources in the rest of the community.”352 Weinerman ultimately decided to establish a
medical triage system and ambulatory care facilities.
Weinerman instituted the medical triage system on 1 July 1963. The purpose of
the triage system, which was adapted from military triage systems, was threefold: to
provide an “immediate, brief medical evaluation,” to determine the nature of the
medical problem, and to make an initial referral to the appropriate service. The ultimate
goal was to “avoid unnecessary congestion in the emergency treatment areas, to enhance
the flow of patient care, and to assist those with non-urgent problems to obtain the kind
of care best suited to their needs.”353 The job of the triage officer was to assign patients to
one of five categories: immediate emergency attention, a short wait for less urgent care,
referral for immediate or subsequent care to an outpatient clinic or private office, referral
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to another community agency, or direct discharge.354 The triage officers were residents
from medicine, surgery, and pediatrics who supervised the ER during the hours from
10A.M. to 10P.M.355According to Weinerman, the surgical staff and residents were
initially “resistant and doubtful” about medical triage because it was a new, unfamiliar
system. This resistance disappeared over time. A ‘before and after’ survey of residents
indicated there was general acceptance of the program as necessary and effective.356
According to Weinerman, the system was a great success because it improved
the quality and convenience of emergency services and improved hospital-community
relationships. Most importantly, it reduced the number of patients in the ER by
discharging non-urgent patients (which comprised 18 percent of the patient population)
or referring them to outpatient facilities. The percentage of patients sent out for referral
or discharge decreased from 24 percent to 13 percent from 1963 to 1965 because patients
started to use the ER less frequently for non-urgent problems.357 The success of the triage
system was demonstrated by a subtle downward trend in patient load. As compared to
Hartford Hospital, the increase in emergency room visits was less pronounced at YaleNew Haven Hospital from 1963 to 1969.358 According to an annual report in 1965, the
triage system “still seems to be the best answer to the proper care of the large number of
patients that are not truly emergent but do require a physician’s attention on
entrance.”359 Weinerman declared that the triage system has “added a new dimension of
354. Ibid.
355. Unsworth, Report on Visits to Emergency Rooms in Other Hospitals (see chap. 3, n. 340).
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hospital service to the community – that of professional evaluation and appropriate
referral of patients with non-urgent medical problems who come to the only door of the
hospital that is always open: that of the Emergency Service.” 360
In spite of its success, Weinerman viewed triage as a temporary solution to the
patient overload. He admitted that “even the most comprehensive of services” would
not be able to “meet the profound community needs that are reflected in the changing
pattern of the once-modest ‘accident room.’” He viewed the “ultimate solution” as the
development of an integrated system of community medical care. When this was
accomplished, he believed that “the emergency service will again be appropriately
named, and triage will no longer be necessary.”361
ER visits remained at manageable levels because ambulatory care facilities
provided an alternative location for non-urgent patients. Several ambulatory care
facilities were established in New Haven: Hill Health Center in 1968, the Community
Health Care Center in October 1971, the Yale Health Plan in July 1971, and the Yale
Primary Care Center in 1974.362 The goal of the Primary Care Center was to “provide
continuity of care rather than episodic care for those patients who were repeated users
of the multiple services of the Emergency Service and the clinics. The Center will also
relieve the Emergency Service of those patients who have sought non-emergency care
through that source, thus making it possible for more concentrated attention to be
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placed on true emergencies.”363 This aim of establishing comprehensive health services,
similar to those championed by the Johnson administration, was to increase access to
health care within the community and to provide patients with an alternative to ER care.
The new triage system was the most significant development at Yale-New Haven
Hospital. Residents continued to run the ER. According to Dr. Albert Weihl, an
attending physician in the ER in the late eighties, minimal supervision of residents
continued through the eighties. A surgeon provided occasional resident supervision
and teaching but only for fifteen to twenty hours a week.364
Dr. David Podell, an internal medicine resident in the eighties, said of his time in
the ER, “we were all loose by ourselves, we were called the lone rangers.”365 According
to Dr. John Schriver, an emergency physician who started his internal medicine
residency at Oregon Health Sciences University in 1968, “they put a very senior resident
in surgery down there, they had to have someone who knew what…they were doing,
because the surgical issues were too important…most of the residents didn’t care for the
rotation very much…your buddies expected you not to admit anybody.”366 As a resident
in the sixties, Schriver recalls, “what you liked, and I think the majority felt this way, is
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that you were own your own, you had a tremendous amount of responsibility, and I
think that many, if not most, wanted to do a good job…I think that those that didn’t like
it…found it pretty challenging…you had to make decisions on limited
information…and one of the great difficulties was that most house staff were hard to
admit to…and so there were political issues in working down there as well…”367
According to Dr. Richard Stahl, referring to the YNHH ER in the eighties, “it was trial by
fire.” There was one incident when a man collapsed in the waiting room from a
ruptured spleen and “just bled out” and died.368 In 1982 the ER moved from the
basement of a nearby medical building into the first floor of the hospital. It was not until
the late 1980s that Weihl got funding from the hospital to hire physicians, usually
fellows in medicine department, to supervise house staff in the ER.

The Changes in the 1960s Served as Temporary Solutions
Triage systems and ambulatory services provided temporary solutions to ER
management. The problems faced at Yale-New Haven Hospital were similar to those
faced in other academic institutions across the country. According to Rosen, an
emergency physician at the University of Chicago, errors in patient care happened in
emergency departments at academic institutions across the country in the early
seventies. “Catastrophic errors were occurring because these were the sickest patients in
the city and there was nobody there to help take care of them.”369 Because of the military
experience and the senior status of the ER house staff, Yale-New Haven Hospital was
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more effective than Hartford Hospital in stabilizing the patient load without amassing
patient complaints or committing gross medical errors. They did not hire attending
physicians to supervise in the ER in the sixties. At academic institutions, emergency
physicians’ entry into academic medicine was delayed, especially in the Northeast.
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8
Conclusion

URBAN TEACHING HOSPITALS DEVELOP TRIAGE SYSTEMS AND
AMBULATORY CARE FACILITIES
Urban teaching hospitals encountered many of the same problems as small
community hospitals. Alexandria, Yale-New Haven, and Hartford hospitals reinforced
the belief that patients had a right to emergency medical care: all three hospitals
provided twenty-four-hour emergency services for all patients, regardless of ability to
pay. ER staffing methods changed more drastically at small community hospitals. This
was not due to a lack of information: all three hospitals considered several options to
restructure emergency services. Many hospitals became aware of the Alexandria Plan
through the AMA’s publication of Emergency Department: A Handbook for Medical Staff.
Small community hospitals such as Fairfax Hospital, Norwalk Hospital, and Danbury
Hospital chose to adopt the new staffing method. Hartford and Yale-New Haven
hospitals considered this staffing method but ultimately decided to develop triage
systems and ambulatory care facilities instead.
There were several reasons that urban teaching hospitals resisted hiring
attending physicians to staff their emergency departments. First, patients’ dissatisfaction
with emergency services had less impact at these hospitals. Unlike Alexandria Hospital,
Hartford and Yale-New Haven hospitals served poor urban populations and were not as
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threatened by the local competition.370 Although patients did not stimulate change,
administrators did. Problems in the Hartford Hospital ER were brought to the attention
of the entire medical faculty in 1964 due to “repeated investigations and reports.”371 In
contrast, Yale-New Haven Hospital’s response to a tragic event in 1967 reflected
favorably on the ER – this worked to the advantage of the ER and secured its reputation
within the hospital.
Financial factors made it difficult for the urban teaching hospitals to institute
changes. The ER was a financial drain for many academic hospitals.372 Even after the
institution of Medicare and Medicaid, emergency departments continued to lose money
because the programs did not provide health insurance coverage to many young
workers. In contrast, the middle-class population in Alexandria had private health
insurance by the early sixties, and the city helped alleviate the costs of care for the
medically indigent. As a result, the emergency room did not suffer such enormous
financial losses, and the hospital was able to offer excellent compensation for emergency
physicians. Because urban teaching hospitals had significantly larger patients loads, they
would have required more physicians than smaller hospitals; this would have been even
more difficult financially. The use of full-time emergency physicians would also have
been difficult from an administrative standpoint. Due to the tension between the
academic medical faculty and community physicians, emergency physicians would have

370. In contrast with Alexandria, the medical faculty at Yale-New Haven Hospital and Hartford
Hospital did not express growing concerns about patient complaints. The medically indigent
population that used the ER in these hospitals may not have lodged as many complaints or their
complaints may have been disregarded.
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had difficulty obtaining admitting privileges and gaining respect in the hospital.373 In
community hospitals, there was less resistance from medical staff. Furthermore,
emergency physicians who were committed to working in their communities for a longtime, such as those in Alexandria, were better able to establish long-term relationships
within the community and to build the reputation of their practice.
Academic hospitals tried to manage the patient overload in the ER by developing
ambulatory care facilities and triage systems. The development of ambulatory care
facilities was consistent with President Johnson’s desire to establish comprehensive
community health centers where patients could go for non-urgent care. The idea of
triage was adapted from war, where sorting patients by severity had led to great
improvements in survival rates. Unlike the military triage systems that required
extensive communication between physicians and medics, these triage systems relied
heavily on the clinical acumen of a house officer. The aim of civilian triage systems – to
decrease non-urgent patient visits – differed from the aim of military triage – to
minimize time to definitive surgical treatment. The civilian triage systems and
ambulatory care facilities, developed to divert non-urgent patients away from the ER,
were somewhat was successful in moderating ER visits.
The EMS systems in all three locations were relatively weak. Although EMS
developed during the late sixties and early seventies in Illinois, Maryland, and Seattle, it
spread sporadically and inconsistently across the country. In these case studies, the
development of EMS systems did not put pressure on the hospitals to improve their
emergency services, although the reverse may have been true: the Alexandria Fire
Department added a third ambulance to its supply after the first year of the Alexandria
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Plan. There were also very few changes that influenced the ER’s status within the
hospital. Yale-New Haven and Hartford hospitals had emergency room committees but
their power was limited; neither granted the emergency room departmental status in the
sixties. The minimal administrative developments at Hartford and Yale-New Haven
hospitals were relatively consistent across the country. By 1969 few emergency services
had departmental status, only 58 percent had a functioning emergency department
committee, and two-thirds had a director but most were part-time.374
In spite of its flaws, the academic hospital’s approach to emergency medicine in
the sixties was at least passable. Academic hospitals had access to more resources,
including specialty services and senior residents, than community hospitals. Although
this was helpful, excellent emergency medical care required more: thorough evaluation,
efficient diagnosis, and appropriate consultation – as quickly as possible. As the variety
of medical illnesses mushroomed and the patient population grew, emergency medicine
became even more challenging. A broad selection of specialists and intelligent but
inexperienced house staff were not a substitute for these skills. Furthermore, the
surgeons were fast becoming out of place in an environment with increasing numbers of
non-urgent, medical, and pediatric cases. This was often overlooked because many of
complicated, life-threatening conditions were of a surgical nature. The surgical successes
overshadowed the inadequate care of non-urgent patients.375
When emergency physicians began working at Hartford Hospital, the medical
staff still harbored strong feelings against them. These problems were not as prevalent in
Alexandria, where four emergency physicians worked at Alexandria Hospital for their
374. Webb, “The Emergency Medical Care System, in a Metropolitan Area” 91.
375. Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report 1970, Office of Information and Development,
February 1971, YNHH Archives, 7.
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entire careers and developed strong relationships within the community. Although
Hartford Hospital used physicians in the ER, Yale-New Haven Hospital did not because
(1) it was likely not affected by the house staff shortage because its affiliation with Yale
School of Medicine made it more attractive to residents (2) it used senior house staff
rather than interns in the ER and (3) the triage system at Yale-New Haven Hospital was
more effective than at Hartford Hospital in moderating the patient load in the sixties.
In terms of specialty recognition, emergency physicians had made very little
progress in the academic hospitals. Coronary care units and triage systems were still
relatively new and underdeveloped, and the academic hospitals had developed a
growing resistance to the idea of full-time emergency physicians.

A COLLABORATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND TEACHING
HOSPITALS
There was a unique collaboration that illustrated the growing acceptance of fulltime emergency physicians. In 1968 Dr. James Dineen and Dr. Steven Goldfinger,
internists at Harvard Medical School, developed a two-week postgraduate course to
educate three physicians who had relinquished their practices and were pursuing
emergency care full-time at Lynn Hospital in Massachusetts.376 The course included time
in the CCU and the ER and lectures on cardiac care and other acute medical illnesses.
House staff and medical faculty taught the course. The program emphasized the
knowledge gap between academic house staff and community physicians and
substantiated the idea that an academic ER could serve as a “classroom” for training

376. Mangold and Frey, “The Physician and the Emergency Health Service System,” 200.
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community physicians.377 According to Goldfinger, “it was a very enriching
experience…it allowed them to recognize their limitations.”378 When the two-week
course came to and end, “they felt ill-prepared and wondered whether they could have
some teaching back on their base.”379
In 1970 Harvard developed a one-year fellowship for continuing education for
resident graduates who were interested in working in emergency medicine full-time.
This program became formalized over the next decade. The program illustrated an
ultimate paradox: the academic ER that served as a teaching ground for community
physicians had many of its own supervision problems. According to Goldfinger, “I did
see emergency medicine as a…treacherous wasteland” where residents were giving
emergency care “with minimal supervision by staff.” Goldfinger became aware of “the
need for a new specialty: the first thirty minutes of anything.”380 Although the program
signified a new collaboration between the academic hospital and community-based
emergency physicians, it did not lead directly to attending supervision in the academic
hospital. Instead it reinforced the idea that residents could teach community physicians
how to provide excellent emergency care.
This program helped fulfill three requirements for specialty recognition: the
differentiation of emergency medicine based on new medical concepts, the

377. Stephen E. Goldfinger and Daniel D. Federman, “Postgraduate Education of Community
Physicians: Emergency Care Training in the Emergency Ward,” Journal of the American Medical
Association 206, no. 13 (December 23-30, 1968): 2883-4.
378. Stephen Goldfinger, MD, telephone interview by author, December 16, 2008. Dr. Goldfinger
currently serves as a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and as a gastroenterologist
at Massachusetts General Hospital. He served as Harvard Medical School’s Faculty Dean for
Continuing Education from 1973 to 2000.
379. Ibid.
380. Ibid.
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representation of a well-defined field of medical knowledge, and the beginning of
education development within the field of emergency medicine. With regard to the
fourth requirement, gaining broad professional support, this new program had a
paradoxical effect. It facilitated the development of positive, collegial relationships
between medical faculty and community emergency physicians, but it also established
the role of the academic hospital as a teaching facility for community physicians.

THE RISE OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE
The 1960s marked the beginning of the development of a new medical specialty.
Medical historian George Weisz argues that there are two distinct logics of specialty
development: (1) elite, hospital-based academic specialties that developed based on
theoretical knowledge and (2) specialties that developed from private medical practice
based on a large volume of patients or incidence of particular health problems.381
Emergency medicine represented a combination of these. The nature of the specialty was
similar to that of private medical practice specialties because (1) many of the first
emergency physicians were GPs who applied their clinical skills in emergency situations
(2) like pediatrics and family medicine, the specialty was broad-based in clinical scope –
it involved the treatment of a large volume of patients with a variety of illnesses (3) as
the emergency room became a substitute for the private physician’s office, a significant
portion of patients had non-urgent problems. However, emergency medicine also
developed as a hospital-based medical specialty because it was defined exclusively by
its location: the hospital emergency room. Because emergency medicine was confined to
the hospital, it needed to gain acceptance in elite academic institutions in order to
381. Weisz, Divide and Conquer, 193.
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achieve specialty recognition. The problem was that the specialty was quite unlike most
hospital-based specialties: it did not emerge based on a narrow field of medical research
or technical procedures. Unlike other hospital specialists, emergency physicians did not
typically participate in clinical research. Because emergency medicine did not fit into
either of the traditional specialty structures, it developed in a unique way. Full-time
specialists in emergency care emerged two decades before emergency medicine
achieved formal specialty recognition.
Weisz also argues that specialization depends on a variety of social, scientific,
technological, and economic factors.382 The specialty of emergency medicine started to
develop in a decade of economic prosperity and social activism when the government,
the media, physician leaders, and the American public demonstrated a growing interest
in improving the quality of emergency services. The financing of government programs
and private health insurance companies further facilitated these changes by increasing
access of emergency services to all Americans. The specialty first developed at
community hospitals where emergency departments served paying patient populations
and were more profitable. Medical advances in pre-hospital and trauma care further
advanced the specialty by establishing emergency medicine as a distinct clinical field
and encouraging further research.
Physician leaders played a critical role in the development of emergency
medicine: they recognized and publicized the inadequacies of emergency care, built on
military concepts to develop organized pre-hospital and trauma systems, contributed to
research in trauma and coronary care, promoted patients’ use of the emergency

382. Ibid., 228.
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department, and became the primary providers of emergency care in the hospital.383 The
first full-time emergency physicians helped to establish broad professional support for
the specialty and ultimately organized at a national level in order to fight for specialty
recognition. Physician leaders in emergency medicine first organized at a national level
in 1968 when they established the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP).
The earliest members of ACEP included several of the early full-time emergency
physicians: Dr. Ronald Leidelmeyer, Dr. James Mills, and Dr. John Wiegenstein at St.
Lawrence Hospital. The primary goals of ACEP were to promote the specialty of
emergency medicine and to provide educational forums for physicians interested in
emergency medicine.384
The concept of staffing the emergency room with full-time emergency
physicians, first formally implemented at Alexandria Hospital, eventually became the
standard at community and academic hospitals across the country. The triage systems
and ambulatory care facilities that developed at larger institutions provided an
infrastructure for emergency care and ambulatory care. Medical advances spurred by
the military further distinguished the field and created a new role for the emergency
room as a critical, intermediate link in the chain of urgent medical services. In the sixties,
a decade of economic prosperity and social activism, the field of emergency medicine
established itself in a nontraditional way as a response to public demand. With the
overarching support of the government, the media, the medical community, and the
383. Mangold and Frey, “The Physician and the Emergency Health Service System,” 198.
384. In the early seventies ACEP started to fight for specialty recognition by expanding its
membership base, holding national conferences on emergency medicine, developing an
examination for practicing emergency physicians, creating the Emergency Medicine Foundation
to promote research and education projects, and publishing an academic journal, Journal of the
American College of Emergency Physicians. ACEP formally created the American Board of
Emergency Medicine in 1976. See Mills, “Emergency Medicine, 1947-1987,” 82; Zink, Anyone,
Anything, Anytime 81-103, 157, 163.
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American public, emergency medicine burgeoned in small communities across the
country. By the end of the decade the first vital steps had been taken on the long journey
towards specialty recognition.
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Figure 8. Emergency service visits by month at Yale-New Haven Hospital in 1953,
1958, and 1963 (Data from “Changing Patterns in Hospital Emergency Service, 1964,” in
Box 58, folder 22, Edwin Richard Weinerman Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale
University Library, New Haven, CT)
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TABLES
Table 1. Hospital Internships and Residencies
!

!

Internship Positions

Year ! Offered Filled
1941
1951
1956
1961
1962
1963

!
!
!
!
!
!

8182
10044
11895
12074
12124
12229

7553
7866
9893
8173
8805
9636

Residency Positions

Filled (%) ! Offered Filled
92
78
83
68
73
79

!
!
!
!
!
!

5256
29645
28528
35403
36502
37357

4100
15851
23012
29637
29239
29485

Filled (%)
78
77
81
84
80
79

Source: “Directory of Approved Internships and Residencies, 1964,” Journal
of the American Medical Association 190, no. 7 (November 14, 1964).

Table 2. Percentage of Emergency Visits to ShortTerm, General, and Other Special Hospitals
!
Year

Emergency
Visits
(millions)

Total Outpatient Visits
(millions)

Emergency
Visits (%)

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

9.4
10.5
12.2
14
16
18.3
20.9
23.9
27.2
31.1
35.5
40.6
46.3

50.4
53.6
59.7
66
72.2
79.1
86.7
95
104.3
114.4
125.7
138.1
151.9

18.7
19.5
20.4
21.3
22.2
23.1
24.1
25.1
26.1
27.2
28.3
29.4
30.5

Source: “Percentage of total outpatient visits to short-term, general, and other special
hospitals which were classified as emergency visits,” Hospital Emergency Services: A
Report on a Conference at Hartford Hospital, in Box 17, folder labeled “Emergency
Services,” Thomas Stewart Hamilton Papers, The Hamilton Archives at Hartford
Hospital, Hartford, CT, 95.
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Table 3. Historical Populations, 1800-1980
Alexandria, VA
Annual
Population Percent
Change
1800 4971
80.9
1810 7227
45.4
1820 8218
13.7
1830 8241
0.3
1840 8459
2.6
1850 8734
3.3
1860 12652
44.9
1870 13570
7.3
1880 13659
0.7
1890 14339
5
1900 14528
1.3
1910 15329
5.5
1920 18060
17.8
1930 24149
33.7
1940 33523
38.8
1950 61787
84.3
1960 91023
47.3
1970 110927
21.9
1980 103217
-7
Year

!
!

Hartford, CT

Annual
Population Percent
Change
!
3523
–
!
3955
12.3
!
4726
19.5
!
7074
49.7
!
9468
33.8
!
13555
43.2
!
26917
98.6
!
37180
38.1
!
42015
13
!
53230
26.7
!
79850
50
!
98915
23.9
! 138036
39.6
! 164072
18.9
! 166267
1.3
! 177397
6.7
! 162178
-8.6
! 158017
-2.6
! 136392
-13.7

!

New Haven, CT

!
Population
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

4049
5772
7147
10180
12960
20345
39267
50840
62882
86045
108027
133605
162537
162655
160605
164443
152048
137707
126021

Annual
Percent
Change
-9.8
42.6
23.8
42.4
27.3
57
93
29.5
23.7
36.8
25.5
23.7
21.7
0.1
-1.3
2.4
-7.5
-9.4
-8.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1790-1980

124

Table 4. Comparison of Population to Emergency Room Visits at Hartford and YaleNew Haven Hospitals
Population (in
Annual Emergency
Net Change (%)a
thousands)
!
Room Visits
Year
Yale-New Haven
YaleHartford Hospital
New
Hartford
Hospital
Hartford
New Haven
Haven Hospital
Hospital
Population Visits ! Population Visits
1955 177.4
164.4 ! 17,641
–
–
–
–
–
1956 177.4
164.4 ! 18,770
–
0
6.4 !
0
–
1957 187.4
165.8 ! 21,272
–
0.1
21 !
0
–
1958 187.3
166.9 ! 21,424
–
0.1
21 !
0
–
1959 185.6
168.5 ! 24,834
–
0
41 !
0
–
1960 162.8
148.9 ! 27,196
40,872
-0.1
54 !
-0.1
–
1961 162.2
152 ! 29,657
40,804
-0.1
68 !
-0.1
-0.2
1962 162.7
152.1 ! 31,890
45,463
-0.1
81 !
-0.1
11.2
1963 161.2
152.1 ! 35,275
48,697
-0.1
100 !
-0.1
19.1
1964 162.8
151.4 ! 40,834
48,674
-0.1
132 !
-0.1
19.1
1965 162.3
150.9 ! 43,068
49,955
-0.1
144 !
-0.1
22.2
1966 162.2
151 ! 46,148
53,566
-0.1
162 !
-0.1
31.1
1967
161
148.2 ! 48,862
56,666
-0.1
177 !
-0.1
38.6
1968 162.8
140.9 ! 51,613
64,290
-0.1
193 !
-0.1
57.3
1969 163.5
139.3 ! 54,486
73,143
-0.1
209 !
-0.2
79
1970 163.6
143.1 ! 60,927
79,313
-0.1
245 !
-0.1
94.1
1971
158
137.7 ! 62,042
87,760
-0.1
252 !
-0.2
114.7
1972 157.6
135.4 ! 63,570
84,788
-0.1
260 !
-0.2
107.4
1973 156.6
136.2 ! 68,346
87,105
-0.1
287 !
-0.2
113.1
1974 155.3
133.9 !
–
97,924
-0.1
– !
-0.2
139.6
1975 156.5
132.5 !
–
88,123
-0.1
– !
-0.2
115.6
Source: Population data from Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut Register and
Manual, 1955-1975; data for Yale-New Haven Hospital from Annual Reports, 19611970, Yale-New Haven Hospital Archives, New Haven, CT; data for Hartford Hospital
from Hospital Emergency Services: A Report on a Conference at Hartford Hospital, in
Box 17, folder labeled “Emergency Services,” Thomas Stewart Hamilton Papers, The
Hamilton Archives at Hartford Hospital, Hartford, CT.
a

Net percentage change of population is calculated from 1955, of Hartford Hospital
emergency room visits is calculated from 1955, and of Yale-New Haven Hospital
emergency room visits is calculated from 1960.
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